Looks good. Similar to ICT, I think, and simpler (from my perspective). What does "ERABW" stand for? This should have a good name; "Least Disappontment Condorcef" or something of the kind.
2012/11/16 Chris Benham <[email protected]> > I propose the following as a reasonably practical, "summable", Condorcet > method: > > *Voters rank from the top however many candidates they wish. Equal-ranking > is allowed. > > The result is determined from a pairwise matrix. On that matrix, ballots > that rank above bottom > any X=Y contribute one whole vote to X>Y and another to Y>X. > > Ballots that truncate both X and Y have no effect on the X>Y and Y>X > entries in the pairwise > matrix. > > With the thus created pairwise matrix, decide the winner with Schulze > (Losing Votes).* > > It isn't a big deal if Ranked Pairs or River are used instead of > Schulze. "Losing Votes" means > that the pairwise results are weighed purely by the number of votes on the > losing side. The "weakest > defeats" are those with the most votes on the losing side, and of course > conversely the "strongest > victories" are those with the fewest votes on the losing side. > > This has these advantages over Winning Votes: it appears to meet the > "Approval Bad Example" > defection-related criterion, it can't fail to elect a positionally > dominant Smith-set member, and it > doesn't have any zero-info random-fill incentive. > > Instead, in the "acceptables versus unacceptables" situation it has the > more natural zero-info > strategy of just equal-top ranking the acceptables and truncating the > unacceptables. > > It doesn't share Winning Votes' compliance with Minimal Defense > (incompatible, or effectively so, > with ABE compliance). > > It has these advantages over Margins: it meets the Plurality criterion and > it meets Steve Eppley's old > "Non-Drastic Defense" criterion. > > That says that if more than half the voters rank X above Y and X no lower > than equal top, then Y > can't win. > > 46: A>C ("sincere" may be A>B) > 10: B>A > 10: B>C > 34: C=B ("sincere" may be C>B) > > More than half the voters rank B above A and B no lower than equal-top, > but Margins elects A. > If the method were Bucklin, B would be the only candidate with a majority > score in the first round. > > Using the rules of my suggested method, the pairwise comparisons go: > > B>A 54>46, A>C 56-44, C>B 80-54 (the 34 C=B have been added to > both sides). > > The weakest defeat (as measured by Losing Votes) is B's, so B wins. Or in > terms of Ranked Pairs, > the strongest pairwise result is A>C so that is locked and the next > strongest is B>A so that is locked > and then C>B is skipped because it's incompatible with an already locked > result; so the final order is > B>A>C. > > Enough for the time being. > > Chris Benham > > > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > >
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