On 7.2.2013, at 20.43, Peter Zbornik wrote: > At second sight, I think that giving different quota weights (V) to > quoted-in candidates would lead to strategic voting leading to the > weaker-gender candidates being placed at the end in order to be > quoted-in, as you mention yourself.
Coming shortly back to this strategy. Let's assume first that the genders are about equally strong across all groupings. One grouping recommends its supporters to rank all female candidates before the male candidates in this election. In the next election the order of the genders will be reversed. The grouping also recommends all its supporters to rank all the candidates of this grouping. The probablity of getting mostly female representatives increases, but in the next election the roles will be reversed. On average this strategy gives more representatives (if other groupings are sincere). If one gender is known to be weaker, then that gender would be ranked last, as you said. If that gender is constantly weaker, this strategy will lead to a constant bias within this grouping to get candidates of the stronger gender. But average number of representetives would grow also in this case (if other groupings are sincere). Juho ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
