Hi all, maybe I should specify, that I prefer (although I don't require), that a top-down approach (Otten, Schulze) to the ordering is applied before a bottom-up approach (Rosenthiel). In our party, we will most probably use a top-down approach.
Best regards Peter Zborník 2013/2/7 Peter Zbornik <[email protected]>: > Hi Juho, > > I have to think this through a bit. > Thanks for the examples. > At second sight, I think that giving different quota weights (V) to > quoted-in candidates would lead to strategic voting leading to the > weaker-gender candidates being placed at the end in order to be > quoted-in, as you mention yourself. > > Best regards > Peter Zborník > > > 2013/2/7 Juho Laatu <[email protected]>: >> I try to address the targets one more round without taking position on how >> the actual algorithm will work. From this point of view I start from the >> question, what is the value of a quoted-in seat. Maybe we can use a constant >> value (V) that is smaller that the value of a normal seat (1). >> >> One problem that we have is that although the value of a quoted-in seat is >> smaller than 1, the final value of that representative may be equal to 1. I >> mean that if we are electing members of a parliament, all elected candiates >> will have one vote each in the parliament. Therefore, from political balance >> point of view, every representative is equally valuable. The lesser value of >> the quoted-in candidate refers only to the fact that some grouping did not >> get their most favoured candidate throuh. >> >> If one tries to meet e.g. regional proportionality and political >> proportionality requirements at one go simultaneously, the only erros are >> rounding errors in the allocation of the last seats. The quoted-in >> requirements and political proportionality requrements are however in >> conflict with each others. One has to decide how much weight to put to the >> need to elect the most liked candidate of a grouping vs. to give all >> groupings equal weight in the parliament. >> >> In the example below, if we assume that five candidates (w1, m3, w3, w2, m4) >> will be elected, and V = 0.5, the "liked candidate points" of the two groups >> will be < 2, 2 > but the voting weights in the parliament will be < 2, 3 >. >> What is the ideal outcome of the algoritms then? Should the algorithm make >> the "liked candidate points" as equal as possible for all groupings, or >> should the algorithm lead to a compromise result that puts some weight also >> on the voting strengths in the parliament? I guess you can do this quite >> well also by adjusting the value of V, e.g. from 0.5 to 0.75. >> >> So far my conclusion is that one could get a quite reasonable algorithm by >> just picking a good value for V and then using some algorithm that optimizes >> proportionality using these agreed weights (and the gender balance >> requirements). >> >> - - - >> >> Personally I'm still wondering if the "less liked candidate reweighting" >> rules are a good thing to have. One reason is the equal voting weight of the >> elected representatives in the parliament. Sometimes the quoted-in >> candidates could be elected also without the quoted-in rules (e.g. if the >> second set of opinions was 50: w3 > m3 > w4 > m4). The algorithm could thus >> not be accurate anyway (could give false rewards). One could also say that >> if some of the groupings doesn't have any good (= value very close to 1) >> candidates of the underrepresented gender, it is its own fault, and that >> shoudl not be rewarded by giving it more seats. >> >> One more point is that the algorithm might favour the quoted-in grouping >> also for other reasons. I'll modify the example a bit. >> >> 45: w1 > w2 > m1 > m2 >> 05: w1 > w2 >> 45: w3 > w4 > m3 > m4 >> 05: w3 > w4 >> >> Here I assume that those candidates that are ranked lower in the votes will >> typically get also less votes in general. Here all male candidates have only >> 45 supporters, while all female candidates have 50 supporters each. Here I >> assume that voters do not generally rank all candiates or all candidates of >> their own grouping (this may not be the case in all elections). Anyway, the >> impact of this possible phenomenon is that at least w3 will be automatically >> ranked third, also without the "less liked candidate reweighting" rules. >> I'll skip the analysis of the fifth seat (it gets too complex). >> >> If the green party is determined that there should be some "liked candidate" >> rules, just forget this last part of my message, I'm not a membr of the >> Czech Green Party anyway :-). >> >> In general I think it is possible to generate an algoritm that does pretty >> accurately what it is required to do. The low number of seats of course >> means that there will be considerable "rounding errors". But I guess that's >> just natural, and all are fine with that, as long as the general principles >> that are used to order the list are fair and as agreed to be. >> >> Juho >> >> >> >> On 7.2.2013, at 16.00, Peter Zbornik wrote: >> >>> Dear Juho, >>> >>> considering your example >>> 50: w1 > w2 > m1 > m2 >>> 50: w3 > w4 > m3 > m4 >>> >>> If we say, that a quoted-in candidate has the value and weight of 1/2 >>> of a seat and if we lower the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota accordingly, so >>> that only half of the number of votes are used, then we actually have >>> a 4-seat election instead of a 5-seat election and thus it is >>> appropriate that one coalition gets both women. >>> >>> That approach is interesting. >>> >>> Now how exactly to value a quoted-in candidate compared to a >>> non-quoted in candidate? >>> One way is to determine the largest Hagenbach-Bischoff quota which >>> elects the last elected candidate, which was not quoted-in (call this >>> quota Qmin) and then compare the value with the quoted-in candidate >>> (Q). >>> (Qmax-Q)/Qmax will be the value of the quoted-in candidate. >>> Lacking a better formula to set the value of the quoted-in candidate a >>> value of 1/2 or 2/3 of a seat for the quoted-in candidate could maybe >>> be used. >>> >>> Maybe someone will propose a better formula to value the quoted-in >>> candidate, >>> which might (or might not) depend on the number of the seat being >>> elected (i.e. it is worse to get seat no. 2 quoted-in, than seat no. >>> 5). >>> >>> P. >>> >>> 2013/2/7 Peter Zbornik <[email protected]>: >>>> 2013/2/7 Juho Laatu <[email protected]>: >>>>> On 5.2.2013, at 19.50, Peter Zbornik wrote: >>>>> >>>>> i] that the seats are quoted-in fairly proportionally between the >>>>> voters (i.e. the same voters do not get both quoted-in seats) and at >>>>> the same time >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> 50: w1 > w2 > m1 > m2 >>>>> 50: w3 > w4 > m3 > m4 >>>>> >>>>> The first seat goes to w1 (lottery). The second seat goes to m3 (male >>>>> representative needed). >>>>> >>>>> I read the rule above so that the third seat should go to w3 (not to w2). >>>>> The rule talks about getting both quoted-in seats, but I guess the >>>>> intention >>>>> is that already the first quoted-in seat is considered to be a slight >>>>> disadvantage that shall be balanced by ranking w3 third. Is this the >>>>> correct >>>>> way to read the rule? >>>> >>>> In a sense yes, but I haven't thought about the problem that way. >>>> The question is how to quantify the "disadvantage", for instance if we >>>> had the votes 55 w1 w2 m1 m2 and 45 w3 w4 m3 m4, should we still rank >>>> w3 third, instead of w2? >>>> >>>>> >>>>> The fourth seat goest to w2. >>>>> >>>>> 1) If we read the rule above literally so, that one grouping should not >>>>> get >>>>> both quoted-in seats, the fifth seat goes to m1. >>>>> 2) If we read the rule so that the quoted-in seats are considered slightly >>>>> less valuable than the normal seats, then the fifth seat goes to m4. >>>> >>>> That is an interesting point. I guess both interpretations are valid. >>>> Personally, at first sight, I like the second interpretation. >>>> I have to think about that a little. >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Which one of the interpretations is the correct one? My understanding is >>>>> now >>>>> that there is no requirement concerning the balance of genders between the >>>>> groupings, so allocating both male seats to the second grouping should be >>>>> no >>>>> problem. But is it a problem to allocate both quoted-in seats to it? >>>>> >>>>> Is the second proportional ordering ( < w1, m3, w3, w2, m4 > ) above more >>>>> balanced / proportional in the light of the planned targets than the first >>>>> one ( < w1, m3, w3, w2, m1 > )? >>>>> >>>>> (The algorithm could in principle also backtrack and reallocate the first >>>>> seats to make it possible to allocate the last seats in a better way, but >>>>> that doesn't seem to add anything useful in this example.) >>>>> >>>>> Juho >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ---- >>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info >>>>> >> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
