On 07/02/2013 07:09 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
> I am sure this meets Droop Proportionality for Solid Coalitions.
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (3 July 2013):
"Does that mean that the method reduces to largest remainders Droop when
the voters vote for all candidates of a single party each?"
Kristopher,
Yes.
STV meets Later-no-Harm because lower preferences only count after the
the fate (elected or definitely eliminated) of more preferred candidates has
been set.
My suggestion doesn't because by not truncating a voter could have their
ballot count towards the election of a non-favourite in an early round (and
a candidate that might have won anyway), and so be reduced in weight and
then not be "heavy" enough to elect the voter's favourite in a later round
(when it would have been if the voter had truncated).
Some STV fans might not like that, but I'm not fully on board with the LNHarm
religion. While I think a very strong truncation incentive is a bad thing,
absolute
compliance with LNHarm makes it more likely that the result will (at least
partly) be
determined by the weak, maybe ill-informed, preferences of voters who are only
really interested in their favourites (and certainly wouldn't have turned out
if their
favourites weren't on the ballot); thereby reducing the "Social Utility" of
the full
set of winners (and maybe compromising the legitimacy of some of them).
I like IRV, but its compliance with LNHarm isn't IMO one of its best features.
Chris Benham
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
