At 10:57 PM 7/3/2013, Chris Benham wrote:
Some STV fans might not like that, but I'm not fully on board with the LNHarm
religion. While I think a very strong truncation incentive is a bad
thing, absolute
compliance with LNHarm makes it more likely that the result will (at
least partly) be
determined by the weak, maybe ill-informed, preferences of voters who are only
really interested in their favourites (and certainly wouldn't have
turned out if their
favourites weren't on the ballot); thereby reducing the "Social
Utility" of the full
set of winners (and maybe compromising the legitimacy of some of them).
LnH was nauseating to the reviewer, I'm sure, because that criterion
guarantees that a method cannot find an optimal compromise in a
fairly common scenario, center squeeze. The equivalent in direct
negotation is someone who refuses to let you know their alternative
preferences until someone pulls out a gun and shoots their favorite.
"Now, will you consider an alternative?"
"Since you put it that way ...."
I like IRV, but its compliance with LNHarm isn't IMO one of its best features.
The discussion was STV. While it is optimal, LNH makes sense in the
first rounds of multiwinner elections.
Ideally, *there is no compromise in representation.*
That is why Asset Voting was such a brilliant invention. I think
Dodgson did understand the issues. If not, well, it is still brillig,
and the slithy toves still gyre and gimble in the wabe.
He was wabe yond nearly everyone else.
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