At 08:24 AM 8/31/2013, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
This may be a bit outside what is usually discussed here, but I'll give
it a shot and if someone know of some resources I should check up on
then please let me know.
Others who know me might expect me to respond to this ....
I've not followed this list for a long time, but my impression is that
the main focus is on the technical or mathematical properties, and less
on the sociological issues.
Usually, yes.
For instance, when voting for persons then candidates with high
popularity and charisma are likely to win more votes than less
charismatic candidates, despite the less charismatic candidates being
far more suited for the task (more knowledge, experience, talent, etc.).
The "task" is undefined here. Yeah, if one is hiring a technician,
sure, perhaps. However, suppose the community is hiring someone to
*represent them.* For that task, the character of the candidate, the
popularity of the candidate, become quite relevant. What's the task?
Someone who is "more suited" for the task of represenative would very
likely have the skills to generate popularity.
In the Norwegian system where we got multiple parties, but two blocks
(left and right), we also see that some people vote for their second
preference rather than the first, because the first is in the wrong
block or intend to cooperate with another party which the voter dislike
the most.
Then that person is not their first preference. There is an internal
contradiction in what is asserted. It assmes that "first preference"
is a simple decision. Indeed, it assumes *popularity* as the
standard, rather than, say, expected behavior in cooperating with
that nasty other party.
As is common with those who stumble across the problem, it hasn't
been analyzed deeply. Instead, there is a focus on symptoms. It's not
surprising; when I began to study the general problem, over twenty
years ago, I found that the study of democratic *systems* was in a
primitive state. Political scientists freqently made pronouncements
that depended on unstated assumptions. Common opinions, to be sure,
but we do expect a bit more from scientists. At least I do.
"The problem of scale in democracy is insoluble." [Follows a proof
that is based on assumptions about what is possible in "democracy,"
that ignores what is *actual practice* in some areas of society.]
With that conclusion as a basis, then, the scientist suggested poor
compromises as the best that can be done. After all, human nature, blah, blah.
Yes, whatever we do, if we are to be effective, must work with
people-as-we-are. But what is possible for real people? My sense is
that much more is possible than we normally see, because what we
normally see is conditioned by present circumstances, and we tend to
assume that those circumstances will continue. Hence natural human
responses will continue, etc.
If it is within the scope of this list, what are your thoughts on the
subject?
It's been discussed before. I'll give some thoughts below.
Alternatively:
Assuming the perfect election system where voting any different than
your real preference would only hurt your preference,
That's quite an assumption! It incorporates a very strange concept
that is, however, common. I'm referring to the concept of "hurting
your preference." That assumes that if the preference is not chosen,
the preference has been *harmed.*
Yes, we imagine that an ideal system would encourage sincere
expression of preference, but we usually then set this up within
complex systems, where complex preferences are expressed. But notice
this: ordinary human conversation, where neighbors have some decision
to make, may involve expression of preferences. If I prefer that we
have white fences, indicating that I might accept yellow fences could
lead rapidly to a compromise of yellow. Have I "hurt" my first preference?
Yes, I have, though it is a weird expression, assuming that my
primary goal is to get along with my neighbors, and that the color of
fence is a lesser goal. If I want white, end of topic, everyone can
go to hell if they don't accept my white fence, well, then, I
wouldn't express "yellow," because my preference is *strong*. A great
deal of confusion is generated by not considering *real preference strength.*
Instead, it is assumed that there is some absolute preference
strength, and people either vote that sincerely, in a method that
allows preference strength expression (i.e., range voting), or they
are "insincere.* But in real life, our preference strengths, the
vigor with which we pursue a preference, is interactive with what we
believe is possible! We make very complex assessments. It appears
that there is no such thing as "absolute preference strength."
However, again in real life, we may bid in an auction, and such bids
may represent some kind of sincerity!
how would you
design a form of government that is elected by the people, but is
resistant to sociological issues that can't be prevented by the election
method (such as the examples mentioned above)?
My answer: don't start with "government." Start with systems designed
to encourage communication, cooperation, and coordination, on a large
scale. If you can solve *that problem*, you do have a possible
solution to the problem of government.
Don't start with an assumption that "sociological issues" are Bad. To
be "Prevented." "Resisted." Rather, understand that what you are
calling sociological issues are part and parcel of the defacto
systems that evolved for collective decision-making. Don't try to
"get rid of them"! You are, if you do this, likely to end up with
something *worse*.
*Use* what exists, and supply what is missing. This is a general
approach that does not just apply to the problem of government!
Now, some ideas.
I could approach this in the general case, and words would multiply.
Instead, I will focus on the problem of creating an assembly that
*fully represents* an electorate. I am not trying to reinvent the
entire deliberative process, so let's assume that this assembly
operates traditionally, i.e., it uses standard democratic process,
developed over centuries. It only makes decisions by majority vote:
no majority, no decision.
It may also develop traditions of seeking more than a mere majority,
where it can accomplish this. I point that out because people
sometimes react to "majority rule" negatively. Rather, the traditions
actually prevent *minority rule,* where the status quo favors a
minority. A society that is making all its decisions by a slight
majority, over strong opposition by a large minority, is
dysfunctional and will be highly inefficient. Besides being
dangerous. And people usually understand that.
The general method for full representation that I'll present was
developed out of a suggestion by Lewis Carroll, what came to be
called Asset Voting. He was looking at STV, and realized that
preferential voting depended upon the ability of voters to order
preferences, to make not just a decent first preference choice, but
then to make lower preference choices, and his opinion was that the
common voter did not generally have the information to do that. This
is pretty obvious, and is addressed by party-list systems, where what
one is really voting for is the favorite *party*. That, however, begs
the question: how does the *party* order its list? If that is done by
the people through elections, then how is *that* election conducted?
Commonly, though parties are run by activists who develop a certain
conflict of interest. This is expressed in the Iron Law of Oligarchy,
which should be understood.
Anyway, Carroll (Charles Dodgson) suggested that when a ballot was
exhausted, the vote would become the "property", as it were, of the
Favorite, to be redistributed at will; the favored candidate is then
empowered and is able to make choices, creating a quota of votes to
determine winners. These winners, then, represent the voter directly
*or indirectly*, having been chosen by, presumably, the most
*trusted* candidate.
Asset was proposed within STV, but what I noticed was my own
preference: I don't know the candidates well, I imagine. I only know
my Favorite, and, in fact, my favorite is someone I can talk with.
(We *assume* that there is a large scale, that the Favorite would be
so popular that the Favorite cannot talk with most supporters.
However, this assumption comes out of voting systems where votes for
a little-known candidate are *useless*, wasted. Asset Voting actually
assigns power to the Favorite, unconditionally. The vote isn't wasted
unless the Favorite actually wastes it!
With Asset Voting, *full representation* becomes possible. That is, a
large number of people can be reduced to a small number of people, by
comparison, the small number *fully representing* the large. Not by
position on issues, necessarily, though that will follow naturally.
*By choice.* That is, every seat will have been chosen directly by a
quota of voters, or indirectly by what I call "electors" chosen by the voters.
The election creates an "electoral college," a collection of *public
voters.* The size of this college might be very large. I have
recommended the use of the Hare quota, with certain measures to
handle what may inevitably be a certain level of nonrepresentation;
the goal is that voting power in the Assembly is directly
proportional to the actual support of the candidate, with excess
voting power being redistributed to other seats.
I.e., if a candidate has more than the quota, the candidate has
excess votes to reassign. Seats have a certain direct voting power,
no more than that. However, because of the creation of the electoral
college, a set of *public voters*, direct/representative democracy
becomes possible.
I won't go into more detail.
Under Asset, the voter has a simple task, whom, out of the universe
of those registered as electors, does the voter most trust to make
decisions in their absence?
That decision will be made on a complex basis; one factor, for me,
would be whether or not I have *direct access to communication* with
the candidate. If I don't, it doesn't matter how much I trust the
person, unless I really am going to disappear and be unavailable for
communication. If I'm voting for someone who is *not going to serve
directly*, which will be so for the vast majority of electors, then
important to me would be this person's communication skills, and
their ability to assess other candidates. Their position on issues is
only a piece of this. I assume there will be similarities, and differences.
(I concluded long ago that if I identified the *perfect person* in
terms of understanding of issues and social goals, *I would disagree
with this person on some issues.* Because I'm not perfect! So, for
me, the general issue is overall trust. Is the person as likely as me
to make a decent decision, or better than I would? That's what I
would look for. Some people might look for a "Yes-Man." Someone who
will appear to agree with them on everything. They may get what they
deserve. But, overall, I expect that an Asset system will improve the
actual trustworthiness of representatives, statistically.)
Asset requires no complex compromises on the part of the voter.
Compromises are worked out through individual negotations by trusted
representatives. It is entirely possible, with direct/representative
Asset -- that allows electors to directly vote on issues -- that any
errors can be fixed, misplaced trust may be redirected, etc.
And we would have, for the first time, true and complete
representation of the People.
Without *contested elections.* Every vote counts, and has an effect
that is visible. I've suggested that electors may reassign votes in
blocks based on precinct totals. If votes from a precinct are totally
-- or mostly -- reassigned as a block, the original voter will know
*exactly* whom was elected by the voter's vote. They will have
*their* representative actually sitting in the Assembly.
And they will have either direct access to the Seat -- if the Seat
has time to talk with them, which can be a problem -- or indirect
access through their elector. If an elector would not talk with me,
within reason, I'd find another elector!
Notice that in this system, electors don't *need* votes. They don't
need to attain any quota. They participate in the process as public
voters, that's all. Being an elector would be a certain amount of
work, but not an overwhelming amount. (If communication with
constituents became a burden, a sane elector would suggest some
reassignment of votes! "Vote for X, over there, she is a great
communicator, and has time.")
Basically, we imagine the political process as some kind of combat,
with winners and losers. That's unnecessary, if the goal is representation.
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