The problem with interconnecting systems is that the complexity increases.
The last thing you need in a software driven system is added complexity.
Software System Safety is probably more of a black art than EMC/EMI, and
just as susceptible to system changes.
Additionally, the interface between hardware and software is a critical
one.

Redundancy still leaves potential problems if the systems are not also
independent.

Even with simple analog electrical circuits the interconnecting of systems
leads to "sneak circuits", and unintended operations.
These sneak circuits can also manifest themselves in software.

A good starting point is the following reference: Software System Safety
Handbook


http://www.system-safety.org/Documents/Software_System_Safety_Handbook.pdf


A good article highlighting the impact of complexity: Software Safety and
Rocket Science

      http://ercim-news.ercim.eu/content/view/473/687/

This page has several other links related to this topic.

Oscar Overton
Product Safety
Lexmark International, Inc.
Phone: 859-232-2284
Email: [email protected]

"Whoever loves money never has money enough; whoever loves wealth is never
satisfied with his income."
 - Ecclesiastes 5:10, NIV



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             Ralph.McDiarmid@c                                             
             a.schneider-elect                                             
             ric.com                                                    To 
             Sent by:                  [email protected]          
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                                                                   Subject 
             02/08/2010 01:56          Re: [PSES] Agency Probes Gas        
             PM                        Pedals' Link to EMI                 
                                                                           
                                                                           
                                                                           
                                                                           
                                                                           
                                                                           




It might be wise to design a circuit which over-rides the accelerator
whenever the brake pedal is depressed. ?That over-ride circuit could be
made fault tolerant through redundancy, but at some level of disturbance no
electronic circuit is likely to be fault-tolerant.

Mechanically linked throttles were also known to stick, sometimes due to
weather. ? ?I wonder if the failure rates of those are comparable to the
electronic versions.
_______________________________________
_____________________________________________


Ralph McDiarmid ?| ? Schneider Electric ? | ?Renewable Energies Business
| ? CANADA ?|



                                                                           
 From:              John Woodgate <[email protected]>                   
                                                                           
 To:                [email protected]                             
                                                                           
 Date:              02/06/2010 02:55 AM                                    
                                                                           
 Subject:           Re: [PSES] Agency Probes Gas Pedals' Link to EMI       
                                                                           







In message <c7927e83.658c2%[email protected]>, dated Sat, 6
Feb 2010, Ken Javor <[email protected]> writes:

>But that's like saying, yes it is possible that it will rain in Death
>Valley, when inquiring if damage to a domicile might have been caused
>by a hurricane.

I was pointing out that the question demanded such a response and was
therefore not the right question.
>
>The real question, given present automotive EMI standards, is "What is
>the probability that a real world threat exceeded the stress levels
>imposed during radiated susceptibility qualification (which runs 100
>V/m or higher to my knowledge)?"

Yes, that's close enough to the right question.

I'm not familiar with the European requirements, which are embodied in
the Automotive Directive, not in standards. But I understand that they
are very stringent. A few significant problems were experienced prior to
the Directive, some involving rural roads exposed to very high RF field
strengths from nearby broadcast transmitters.

Nevertheless, no amount of testing, however stringent and
well-implemented, can foresee all possibilities, because the
micro-environment in the vehicle can be affected by the owner. For
example, a metal box without a lid might act as a resonant cavity and
produce a local highly-intensified field strength close to an
electronics box hidden behind a side panel of the vehicle interior.
--
OOO - Own Opinions Only. Try www.jmwa.demon.co.uk and www.isce.org.uk
John Woodgate, J M Woodgate and Associates, Rayleigh, Essex UK
I should be disillusioned, but it's not worth the effort.

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