All,

We've put together an update to the GPSK draft to address the last call comments. Below is a list of the identified issues and their solutions. For a variety of issues we recommended no change with a brief description. If more detail is desired, we can certainly discuss them further on the list.

You can find the latest version here, pending the I-D editor's release:

http://www.tschofenig.com/svn/draft-clancy-emu-eap-gpsk/draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-04.txt

--
t. charles clancy, ph.d.  <>  [EMAIL PROTECTED]  <>  www.cs.umd.edu/~clancy


-----------
 TECHNICAL
-----------

Issue: why not use EAP-TLS-PSK instead (narayanan)
Resolution: no change -- WG consensus was to do GPSK

Issue: MAC does not cover the EAP or GPSK header (Dondeti, Narayanan)
Resolution: no change -- protecting the EAP header is pointless, since
            the EAP engine would not be able to validate the MAC.  The
            GPSK header only includes an op-code, which can be
            implicitly checked by validating the MAC on the rest of the
            packet contents.

Issue: use of SHA-1 (Aboba)
Resolution: switched AES ciphersuite to use SHA256

Issue: KDFs do not appear compliant with draft-dange-nistkdf-01 (Aboba)
Resolution: no change, NIST reviewed our KDF, and the current one is
            based specifically on their recommendations

Issue: Why doesn't the MK derviation use the PSK as it's keying input,
       instead of all zeros?  (Dondeti)
Resolution: no change -- The PSK can be of arbitrary length, and
            therefore may not be the correct length to use as the KDF
            input key.

Issue: revert to previous KDF based on MACs (Dondeti, Narayanan)
Resolution: no change -- the KDF changes from MAC to Hash were
            proposed by NIST

Issue: Use of CTR instead of CBC to avoid implementing AES decryption
       code (Dondeti)
Resolution: no change -- we discussed this at length, CTR does its
            own integrity protection, which would be redundant, hence
            the decision to use CBC instead

Issue: dropping nonparsable packets is EAP behavior (Narayanan)
Resolution: changed to talk about parsing EAP-GPSK packets, rather than
            EAP packets

Issue: derive keys individually rather than deriving a big block
       and then split it up (Narayanan)
Resolution: no change -- places fewer restrictions on the KDF, and
            guarantees cryptographic independence

Issue: derivation of PK when not using an encryption Ciphersuite
       (Narayanan)
Resolution: removed PK from hash ciphersuite discussion, added other
            comments indicating it's lack of necessity for
            non-encrypting ciphersuites


-----------
 EDITORIAL
-----------

Issue: citing old drafts (Malinen)
Resolution: moot, as references were removed

Issue: s/needs to instantiated/needs to be instantiated/ (Malinen)
Resolution: text edited

Issue: discussion of other protocols and deficiencies (Aboba)
Resolution: section removed

Issue: quick availability as a design goal (Aboba)
Resolution: text edited

Issue: design goal s/Wide Applicability/Security Model/ (Aboba)
Resolution: text edited

Issue: efficiency design goal, mention round trips (Aboba)
Resolution: text edited

Issue: efficiency design goal, mention Privacy not supported (Aboba)
Resolution: no change -- privacy supported if AES ciphersuite is used

Issue: define peer/server/session-ID (Aboba)
Resolution: defined

Issue: ambiguous definition of KS with respect to hashes (Dondeti)
Resolution: removed ambiguous text

Issue: erronious references to multiple protected payload blocks (Dondeti)
Resolution: fixed some references -- others referred to them as plural
            as you can have a total 3 in the entire protocol exchange

Issue: order of key definitions in terminology section (Dondeti)
Resolution: changed the order to be alphabetical -- not quite what was
            proposed, but logical IMHO

Issue: precision of some of the protocol specification (Dondeti)
Resolution: made some minor edits

Issue: GPSK-4 is needed only as a filler, specify that (Dondeti)
Resolution: no change, GPSK-4 can contain a PD_Payload_Block

Issue: Text involving validation of keys after GPSK-4 (Dondeti)
Resolution: text revised

Issue: discussion of MACs in KDF section (Dondeti)
Resolution: text replaced

Issue: instead of length(Csuites_List) use NumberOf_CSuites to save
       one byte (Dondeti)
Resolution: no change -- using a 2-byte length makes parsing code
            consistent across all length-prefixed data blocks

Issue: EAP terminology renamed (Narayanan)
Resolution: s/client/peer/g



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