On 2019-11-12 3:53 p.m., Jan-Frederik Rieckers wrote: > On 12.11.19 00:15, Owen Friel (ofriel) wrote: >> One deployment consideration is if an operator wants to use a public PKI >> (e.g. Lets Encrypt) for their AAA certs, then it could be years, if ever, >> before these extensions could be supported (as Alan alludes to), so it would >> also be good to define how this could work with standard RFC 6125 DNS-IDs / >> RFC 5280 dNSNames. > I had a lot of thoughts about this topic. > I am experimenting with certificates in EAP-TLS contexts and experienced > the problems with getting a certificate with specific extension > properties from our public PKI. (In my case a test certificate with a > critical MustStaple extension)
You were trying to do a CSR with some extra attributes with a CA (using ACME? Using LetsEncrypt?) and the CA ignored the things that it couldn't verify? > The Problem with dNSNames is that they are also used in other contexts > (mainly HTTPS). There would be the possibility to define a specific > prefix to bind it to a Realm without having the certificate being valid > for the HTTPS host (e.g. eap-tls.uni-bremen.de for the realm > uni-bremen.de) but I don't see the advantage in that. > This will probably don't really lead to a change in the supplicants > implementations. I think you are saying that the problem with dNSNames is that web servers use them/pay-attention to them, so CAs are careful what they put in. That's a reason to avoid that SAN in my opinion. Toerless, in draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane went the other direction, and argued that only dNSNames have good interoperability, and so we have to use only them. > My deployment experience shows, that the certificate check is the main > security problem in WPA2-Enterprise networks. I have seen instructions > for installing WPA2-Enterprise networks where they have explicitly > suggested switching off the certificate check, probably because it was > too complicated for the users and would lead to people complaining at > the IT department about the complicated setup. So, as I understand it, the enrollment process for laptops/phones into WPA-Enterprise does not include retrieving a set of anchors for that connection. Or that it is just too hard to do. It works fine if the devices are compelled by their corporate masters, but this fails for BYOD, and it fails for cross-realm (which eduroam is).
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