Hi Alan,I don't think Tim could be blamed for holding the view that there is a separation between specifications and how they are used. There's good and bad to the practice. The good is that the spec can be used in ways that the creators didn't intend, and thus perahsp there are fewer unnecessary constraints.
On the other hand, not having a theory of operation section, as we do have in a good number of our specs, leads to people really not understanding when they are applicable, and perhaps more importantly, when they are not.
All of this having been said, perhaps the best way to go forward is to have a requirements discussion in terms of the sorts of operations we would like to see as part of the authentication process – as opposed to elsewhere.
I see tremendous opportunity here, to be honest. But it's a lot of work. Eliot On 03.07.21 13:35, Alan DeKok wrote:
We have specs with Security Considerations, and implementation guidelines. They're a lot more than just what bits go on the wire. In general, a BCP is too late in the process. Vendors have already implemented the base spec, so what's "current" is a random grab-bag of stuff decided on by product managers, or by junior engineers. I've seen many, many, sites unable to deploy the security they want, due to a wide range of limitations in products. IMHO, these are security issues, and should be treated as such in the base specification. There should be clear guidance given on a wide range of issues, such as security, implementation, UI, workflow, etc. Not having those guidelines is a large source of income for me. But it is endlessly frustrating for everyone involved. I would prefer to help people build useful systems, instead of having them pay me to paper over issues in multiple products. Alan DeKok. _______________________________________________ Emu mailing list Emu@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
OpenPGP_signature
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
_______________________________________________ Emu mailing list Emu@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
