> I can see a use case you seem to have neglected. Not neglected: considered and rejected.
First: Arthur C. Clarke famously observed that advanced technology cannot be differentiated from magic, and it's true. Just like we refuse to defend against shamans, psychic intruders, and the restless ghost of Alan Mathison Turing, we also refuse to defend against quantum computing. Because it's the same thing. Magic. And we're not going to even think of appeasing cargo-cultists who think we ought shake a feather-covered stick to appease the gods of Quantum. This should not be read as a slam on the people who are working in the field. They're doing great work trying to make the future real. But for right now, it's completely unreasonable to expect practical systems to defend against quantum computation. Further: Enigmail provides OpenPGP support. QRC isn't in RFC4880 or any of the supporting RFCs. One might wonder *why* the Working Groups haven't incorporated QRC into the supporting RFCs... or one might suspect they're using the same reasoning we are. The Working Groups are closely following QRC, and as soon as it becomes an issue for practical systems to worry about, they'll take appropriate steps. Finally: the letters "PGP" in "OpenPGP" stand for "Pretty Good Privacy". And that's what Enigmail provides... a *pretty good* level of privacy. You're expecting a level of privacy that not even the United States government requires for information classified Top Secret. (They're happy with elliptical-curve keys in the 500-bit range, which are even more susceptible to quantum computing than a 1024-bit RSA key!) Be reasonable. We're not promising anything beyond a "pretty good" level of privacy, and we're definitely not going to start doing rain dances to appease the gods of quantum. _______________________________________________ enigmail-users mailing list [email protected] To unsubscribe or make changes to your subscription click here: https://admin.hostpoint.ch/mailman/listinfo/enigmail-users_enigmail.net
