Teman-teman,
Ini ada info dari Greenpeace tentang pengapalan sekitar 446 kg
plutonium dari Eropa ke Jepang. Bahan bakar plutonium ini oleh IAEA
dikategorikan sebagai material senjata "category one" yaitu material
yang siap untuk dirakit menjadi bom nuklir. Bahan ini diperkirakan
hanya memerlukan waktu 1-3 minggu untuk mengubahnya menjadi bom nuklir
dan jumlah diatas cukup untuk merakit 60 bom nuklir.
Pengapalan material yang sangat toksik ini akan membahayakan
masyarakat dan negara yang dilalui oleh rute perjalanan kedua kapal
pengangkut tersebut: Pacific Pintail dan Pacific Teal. Ini merupakan
pengapalan komersial pertama terhadap bahan nuklir.
Untuk menekan biaya (tujuannya saja komersial), pengamanan terhadap
kedua kapal sipil itu diminimalkan. Pengapalan plutonium dari Eropa
ke Jepang pada tahun 1992 dikawal oleh kapal perang dari Jepang.
Pengapalan kali ini tidak demikian, tetapi sebagai gantinya kedua
kapal akan saling mengawal, sehingga menyebabkan resiko semakin tinggi
karena amunisi, bahan-bahan peledak, sejumlah besar bahan bakar minyak
dan plutonium dimuat dalam satu kapal yang sama.
Karena perjalanan bahan nuklir ini dari Eropa ke Jepang sangat
dirahasiakan maka tidak diketahui apakah kedua kapal itu akan melalui
atau mendekati perairan Indonesia. Tetapi sebagai tindakan preventif,
sebaiknya kita perlu menanyakan hal ini kepada Pemerintah, terutama
sikap Pemerintah terhadap pengapalan plutonium tersebut.
Salam,
Djoni Ferdiwijaya
PS: info berikut saya terima dalam bentuk ter-encripe. Untuk
memudahkan saya telah meng-decripe file tersebut dan disajikan dalam
bentuk dibawah ini. Bentuknya agak lain dari file aslinya, tapi isinya
tidak berubah.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Self <ysumarla>
Subject: Plutonium Shipment
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 1999 14:50:34
Dear All
Following is the information about the shipment of weapon-usable
Plutonium from France to Japan. The first information (4pagebrf.mox)
is the short briefing about the shipment. Covered in this briefing are
three important concerns about the shipment: the secrecy of the
shipment route, inadequate security arrangement for the shipment, and
possible misuse of the plutonium for military purposes.
The second information (LettertogovtJune.doc) is the letter for the
governments to remind them about the probable danger of the plutonium
shipment. The third (TsurugaPlantAccident03.doc) is the news about the
latest nuclear plant accident in Tsuruga Plant, Japan. The fourth
(MOXSendingConfirmed.doc) is the confirmation of the plutonium
shipment from La Hague, France. The fifth is the news from Asahi
Shimbun about the planned meeting between Korean and Japan government
about the shipment route. The last (KoreanEnquireJaps.doc) is Asahi
Shimbuns news about Korean's government meeting with the Japan
government about the shipment.
The reasons for sending this information are:
1. Asia countries territory are located in the possible route of the
shipment. National NGOs must remind the governments to take action
against the shipment.
2. In case of accident, there is no arrangement made by the company to
compensate the possible hazard to the country or people where the
accident takes place. National NGOs must urge the government to press
the company to arrange compensation in case of nuclear accident along
the shipment route.
3. If the governments show indifferent reaction to the call, it is a
work of national NGOs to press the shipping company to cancel the
shipment, both for environmental reasons or security reasons.
4. National NGOs should press their governments to demand the
governments of France, England, and Japan to disclose a plan for
security arrangement for the shipment and the load in the shipment.
5. In case that the shipment breaches the particular countrys
national law about shipment of dangerous materials from, through, or
to the country, national NGOs should demand the government to apply
the law in order to uphold national sovereign in its territory.
You can the first information to start an action and the second one to
call attention of your respective governments over the dangerous
plutonium shipment. The third information is important to support the
fact that the Japanese nuclear program is unreliable to process the
plutonium. While the fourth information is necessary to confirm the
shipment to the governments, the last information shows the
seriousness of the issue that Korean government has taken measures to
anticipate it.
------------------------------
STOP PLUTONIUM
GREENPEACE
Secret Shipment of Nuclear Bomb Material From Europe to Japan
July 1999
OVER the next few weeks, two ships carrying a secret cargo of
dangerous, nuclear weapons-usable plutonium fuel will leave ports in
Britain and France and sail around the globe to Japan. On board will
be fuel containing more plutonium than in the entire Indian and
Pakistani nuclear weapons programmes.(1)
The two British flagged vessels, the Pacific Teal and the Pacific
Pintail, will leave Barrow in Britain and Cherbourg in France carrying
the first commercial shipment to Japan of mixed-oxide (MOX) reactor
fuel, made from plutonium and uranium. An estimated 446 kilograms of
plutonium is contained in the 40 nuclear fuel elements enough
fissile material to construct 60 nuclear bombs. The International
Atomic Energy Agency classifies this plutonium fuel as a "category
one" "direct use" weapons material, and estimates it would take just
1-3 weeks to convert into nuclear bombs.
The shipments mark a new and dangerous phase of the nuclear industry;
the plan to expand the use of plutonium fuel (MOX) in conventional
nuclear reactors in Japan and around the world. These reactors were
not designed to burn plutonium fuel and its use will significantly
reduce safety margins. Plants in the United Kingdom and France are set
to massively expand production of MOX fuel if Japan signs contracts
based on a successful transport this year.
If the shipments are successful and MOX fabrication expands, then the
international community faces 80 more such shipments over the next ten
years, the spread of nuclear weapons material more widely than ever
before, and raised tensions in one of the most politically volatile
regions of the world Asia. Public health and the environment will be
put at increased risk from radioactive pollution and nuclear
accidents, as reactors burn a fuel they were not designed to handle.
As plutonium is highly radio-toxic, the shipments will also pose a
danger to countries en route. While the probability of a transport
accident may be low, the consequences for the environment and public
health could be devastating.
ROUTE OF PLUTONIUM FUEL (MOX) SHIPMENT KEPT SECRET
THE plutonium (MOX) fuel shipment is being conducted for the Japanese
electrical utilities Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and Kansai
Electric Power Company (KEPCO) by Britain and France. The plutonium
has been produced from the reprocessing of nuclear spent fuel at two
sites in Europe: Sellafield in northern England, operated by British
Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL), and La Hague in North France, operated by
COGEMA. These two sites are the largest producers of plutonium on the
planet. Combined, the sites have in storage more than 100 tonnes of
plutonium -- more than is in the US nuclear weapons stockpile. The
contracts for the production of the plutonium fuel were signed on
behalf of the Japanese utilities by Mitsubishi and Toshiba. Plutonium
fuel for TEPCO has been produced at Dessel in Belgium and transported
by road to La Hague prior to sea shipment to Japan, where it will be
loaded in the Fukushima nuclear power plant. The plutonium fuel for
Kansai has been produced at Sellafield and will be shipped directly to
Japan for loading at the Takahama nuclear power plant. These pilot
contracts are intended to test the technical and logistical
feasibility of a MOX fuel cycle extending from Japan to France,
Britain and Belgium.
The route the shipment will take remains a closely guarded secret by
Japanese, French and British authorities and the operating companies.
The nations along the various potential routes have not been informed
nor asked for their permission for the shipment to travel through
their regions. Given that more than fifty countries around the globe
protested earlier Japanese plutonium and nuclear waste shipments,
the transporting countries have a strong interest in keeping the
enroute nations uninformed.
Based on previous transports of high level nuclear waste from Europe
to Japan and a shipment of plutonium in 1992, the imminent plutonium
fuel shipments can be expected to take one of the following three
routes from Europe to Japan:
* south along the west coast of Africa, around the Cape of Good Hope,
across the Indian Ocean and north through the Tasman Sea and South
Pacific (the route of the 1992 Akatsuki Maru plutonium shipment)
* west across the Atlantic Ocean, through the Mona Passage, across the
Caribbean Sea, through the Panama Canal and across the Pacific (this
was the route of high level nuclear waste shipments of 1998 and 1999)
* southwest across the Atlantic, along the east coast of Latin
America, around Cape Horn and northwest across the Pacific (this was
the route of the first high level nuclear waste in 1995)
Assuming that the two and a half month voyage is made without mishap,
the two freighters will enter Japanese waters and unload their
plutonium cargoes in the private harbours which service the Fukushima
and Takahama reactors.
INADEQUATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE VESSELS
THE two freighters carrying the plutonium fuel, the "Pacific Pintail"
and the "Pacific Teal", are both operated by Pacific Nuclear Transport
Limited (PNTL), which is owned by BNFL, COGEMA and the Japan
Federation of Electrical Power Companies. Because international
regulations require military security arrangements for cargoes of
nuclear bomb-usable material, the ships will be armed with 30 mm
cannons and carry armed UK Atomic Energy Agency police, which normally
guard British nuclear weapons facilities.
A previous shipment of plutonium from Europe to Japan in 1992 was
accompanied by a Japanese naval escort that included a warship loaded
with commando boats, machine guns and helicopters. However, because
the nuclear industry wants to cut costs and portray the upcoming
shipment as a routine commercial transport rather than a proliferation
threat, the two civilian vessels will act as an escort for each other.
This arrangement is clearly inadequate to deter any determined
physical attack and in fact creates more hazards by storing ammunition
and explosives together with large quantities of fuel oil and
plutonium on the same vessel.
A 1988 US Department of Defense threat assessment report on plutonium
shipments concluded that in order to "adequately deter theft or
sabotage, it would be necessary to provide a dedicated surface
combatant to escort the vessel throughout the trip". Even with an
escort "no one could guarantee the safety of the cargo from a security
incident, such as an attack on the vessel by small, fast craft,
especially if armed with modern anti-ship missiles."
The United States has a legal responsibility for the security of the
plutonium fuel shipments to Japan as it originated from US enriched
uranium and is therefore covered by US rules of origin. This means
that plans for the transport of MOX fuel from Europe to Japan must
comply with specific US requirements concerning safety and physical
protection. These are set out in the 1988 US-Japan agreement on
nuclear co-operation and include the requirement either that the
transport ship should be accompanied by an armed escort vessel or that
alternative security measures acceptable to the US should be in
place.
In February this year the Chairman of the US House of Representatives
International Relations Committee, Benjamin Gilman, expressed his
concern that the transportation plan does not meet, or is not
equivalent, to the physical protection measures specified in the 1988
Japan-U.S. agreement. In a letter to Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright (11th Feb 1999), Gilman said:
"In my view, escort vessels which are minimally armed and have a top
speed of 13 knots, would not appear to have sufficient defensive and
deterrent ability, much less the manoeuvrability or speed of military
or coast guard escort ships. With regard to armaments, I would expect
that any proposed escort vessel would include a radar-directed,
anti-missile defence system.
"At a minimum, the measures applied to the 1992 shipment of separated
plutonium should be used for this MOX shipment, including the use of
an armed escort vessel for the entire voyage."
Despite these concerns the U.S. State Department has approved the
present security arrangements, raising questions about the Clinton
Administration's commitment to applying an effective and consistent
nuclear non-proliferation policy.
PLUTONIUM THE BASIC INGREDIENT OF A NUCLEAR BOMB
PLUTONIUM is a highly radio-toxic element, all but non-existent in
nature, which is produced in nuclear reactors. Inhalation of a single
microgram, smaller than a speck of dust, can cause fatal lung cancer.
Plutonium is the most highly prized fuel --or fissionable material--
for making nuclear weapons, and has been an essential fuel driving
the nuclear arms race over the last half century. Given its long
half-life, some 24,000 years, once produced, plutonium remains a
deadly environmental contaminant and a potential fuel for nuclear
weapons.
Plutonium is produced as a nuclear reactors uranium fuel becomes
irradiated -- bombarded by neutrons -- some of the uranium is changed
into plutonium and remains contained in the irradiated or spent
nuclear fuel. In the case of "military production reactors" this
process of plutonium production is maximised, but all conventional
nuclear power reactors produce plutonium.
In order to access this plutonium for nuclear weapons purposes, the
nuclear weapons states developed a very dirty and dangerous chemical
separation technology known as "reprocessing". Through this process,
the spent fuel is chopped up, chemically dissolved and the plutonium
is separated out of the resulting stew of highly radioactive,
long-lived nuclear waste. This process involves massive routine
discharges of radioactivity to the air and sea, tremendous risks of
explosions, radioactive releases, and worker exposure. The two major
reprocessing plants in the world are located at Sellafield in the
United Kingdom and La Hague in France.
The nuclear industry's original plan was to use plutonium in "fast
breeder reactors" which would breed, or generate, more plutonium than
they used. With the technical and economic collapse of these breeder
reactors world-wide, the plutonium reprocessing industry faced a dead
end. So the industry is now proposing burning plutonium mixed with
uranium (MOX) in conventional, light water reactors.
The nuclear industry claims that extracting plutonium from the MOX
fuel is a technically complicated process that thus reduces the risk
of its diversion into nuclear weapons programmes, or the risk of
seizure by terrorists. However in reality MOX fuel can be handled with
little difficulty and plutonium can be extracted in any reasonably
well-equipped laboratory using standard chemical processes. Dr Frank
Barnaby, a nuclear physicist who worked at the UK's Nuclear Weapons
Establishment at Aldermaston between 1951 and 57, says: "If a
terrorist group acquired MOX fuel, it could relatively easily
chemically separate the plutonium and fabricate a nuclear explosive".
The U.S. Department of Energys Office of Arms Control and
Non-Proliferation also acknowledged this point in a 1997 report:
"Nevertheless, it is important to understand that fresh MOX fuel
remains a material in the most sensitive category because plutonium
suitable for use in weapons could be separated from it relatively
easily".
A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT THAT CAN'T HAPPEN?
ALTHOUGH an accident involving the release of even a small fraction of
the plutonium contained in one of these shipments could have
devastating results for the environment and public health, safety
considerations have been seriously jeopardised by cost-cutting and
secrecy. Inadequate design, testing and construction of the transport
containers, insufficient emergency planning, and inadequate liability
coverage suggest that the industry and governments involved are simply
unwilling to pay the cost of making anything but their profits safe.
The plutonium fuel is to be carried in type-B nuclear transport flasks
that were designed to carry spent fuel. Under IAEA regulations such
flasks are designed to withstand a drop of nine meters on to an
unyielding surface (13 metres/second), being engulfed in fire at 800
degrees C for 30 minutes, and immersion at a depth of 15 metres for
eight hours. Transports can be by road, rail, sea or air.
Regardless of the transport mode, the design specifications of the
flask can be easily exceeded. For example, a fire raged aboard the
ferry Moby Prince for over 45 hours and exceeded 1,000 degrees C after
it collided with an oil petroleum tanker, the Agip Abrozzo, off the
Italian port of Livorno in 1991. According to the International
Maritime Organisation (IMO), on average, shipboard fires burn for 23
hours at sea and 20 hours in port, while the US Department of Energy
admits that petroleum fires can exceed 1,000 degrees C.
Under existing liability agreements, there is no certainty that
compensation would be paid to enroute states in the event of an
accident. At best, international conventions and other arrangements
may provide some compensation, but no assurances exist whatsoever that
the full costs of health, environmental and economic damages would be
paid to victims enroute states.
CONCLUSION
UNLESS international controversy puts a stop to future shipments of
plutonium fuel around the world, a new and deadly phase in the nuclear
cycle will be established. The proposal to burn plutonium (MOX) fuel
in conventional reactors -- a proposal intended to justify the
survival of the plutonium programmes of Britain, France and Japan --
threatens to create dangerous nuclear proliferation and environmental
risks. The shipments therefore undermine international
non-proliferation objectives and put the health and security of
millions of people in danger. The only way forward is to stop the
reprocessing of plutonium and cancel plans for the use of MOX fuel in
nuclear reactors globally. Unless this occurs, growing stockpiles of
"civil" plutonium will soon rival military stockpiles, and
international attempts to agree an effective and verifiable ban on the
production and use of plutonium and other fissile materials will be
fatally undermined.
(1) The current plutonium stockpile of India is estimated to be 350kg
and the plutonium-equivalent of Pakistans stockpile, 67.2kg, giving a
total of 417kg, according to a 1999 report by David Albright of the
Institute for Science and International Security, based in Washington
D.C. Albright was a member of the United Nations weapons inspection
team in Iraq.
For more information contact: Greenpeace International Nuclear
Campaign +31 20 523 6222 or the Greenpeace International Press desk
+31 20 524 9547/46
Greenpeace on the web: www.greenpeace.org
------------------------------
[Title, Name]
[Position]
[Government Department]
[Address 1]
[Address 2]
X June 1999
[Greeting],
I am writing to alert your government to clandestine shipments of
Japanese plutonium fuel from Europe to Japan which are expected
shortly. These shipments of nuclear weapons-usable material may pose a
significant safety and security threat to your country.
According to information compiled by Greenpeace, two armed vessels
will leave Britain and France as early as mid-July, loaded with the
first ever commercial scale shipments of mixed plutonium/uranium oxide
(MOX) fuel. The "Pacific Teal" and the "Pacific Pintail", two nuclear
freighters operated by Pacific Nuclear Transport Ltd (UK), will load
their cargo in the French port of Cherbourg and the British port of
Barrow-in-Furness and are due to leave for Japan between mid-July and
September.
The plutonium fuel involved in these shipments is classified by the
International Atomic Energy Agency as a "category 1", direct-use
nuclear weapons material. It can readily and swiftly be converted into
a form which can be used in nuclear bombs. The two ships will carry
some 40 fuel assemblies containing an estimated 450 kilograms of
plutonium -- sufficient plutonium to construct up to 50 nuclear bombs.
The transports thus raise serious security and proliferation concerns.
Moreover, plutonium is an extremely radiotoxic material. If inhaled
into the human lung, a tiny amount can cause fatal lung cancer. In
the event of an accident, release of even a fraction of the plutonium
fuel could pose significant risks to the environment and public
health. In Greenpeace's view, these transports pose an unjustifiable
risk to global security and to human health and the environment.
The Japanese, French and British governments responsible for these
shipments have chosen not to involve en route states in prior
consultation on the route, or on emergency or salvage planning. No
assurances have been given relating to emergency response, damage
mitigation or liability for any damage caused. While the Japanese
government is not revealing which way these transports will go, your
country lies along one of the possible transport routes. Accordingly,
we believe that your government needs to be aware of and take action
against these dangerous shipments and the industry that drives them.
You may recall that in 1992, the Akatsuki Maru made the first pilot
shipment of plutonium from Europe to Japan, arousing enormous
international controversy. In the face of protests from more than 50
governments, Japan announced that it would temporarily suspend such
shipments. However, Japan, which currently holds contracts to separate
some 40 tonnes of plutonium at reprocessing plants in France and
Britain, has now moved to resume these shipments, in the form of
fabricated plutonium fuel. Accordingly, if this year's shipments go
ahead, they will therefore be the first of dozens of such shipments
over the next decade. They could also have the effect of launching a
rapid expansion in the use of MOX fuel in conventional nuclear
reactors in other countries -- a development with global proliferation
implications.
In 1992, the plutonium shipment was made via the Cape of Good Hope,
the Indian Ocean, Tasman Sea and the South Pacific. Subsequently,
four controversial high level nuclear waste shipments -- the waste
product of the same plutonium reprocessing process that is responsible
for producing the MOX fuel -- have been made along three different
routes from France to Japan: through the Caribbean Sea and Panama
Canal; around Latin America/Cape Horn and across the Pacific; and
along eastern Africa, around the Cape of Good Hope, across the Indian
Ocean and up through the Tasman Sea and South Pacific.
A primary reason for the use of these different routes was that
British, French and Japanese officials hoped to find a "path of least
resistance". Instead, they have been faced with protests and
declarations from dozens of en route countries condemning these
extremely hazardous shipments. With this double shipment of plutonium
fuel, they once again intend to test one of these routes.
Greenpeace strongly encourages your Government to consider taking the
following steps at national, regional and international level to stop
these shipments:
* Express your government's opposition to the upcoming transport of
plutonium fuel publicly and to the Japanese, British and French
governments at the highest level;
* Urge the immediate cessation of transports at least until a
comprehensive environmental impact assessment has been conducted and
an arrangement requiring prior informed consent has been established
as to the timing, route and nature of any such transports through your
region;
* Consider the development of legislation excluding such shipments
from waters under your country's jurisdiction;
* Work with other countries in your region to enact regional
instruments prohibiting such shipments through the region's waters or
requiring prior informed consent, environmental impact assessments and
full responsibility for liability for any damage caused to be
undertaken by those undertaking the shipments;
* Engage with the Conference on Disarmament's on-going negotiations on
fissile materials to ensure that a treaty be concluded that provides
for a comprehensive ban on all plutonium separation and use for any
purpose, in order to ensure a truly effective and verifiable
non-proliferation regime.
Please find further information enclosed which backgrounds the status
of Japan's plutonium programme and the proliferation and environmental
risks it raises. If your government does take action on this issue,
we would very much appreciate receiving any information about the
steps which you have taken.
Yours sincerely
Thilo Bode
Executive Director
Greenpeace International
Annex 1: Japan's Plutonium Programme.
The plutonium fuel (MOX) transports scheduled in the next few months
are driven by Japan's plutonium program. Under this program, Japan
exports spent nuclear fuel from its nuclear power reactors to France
and Britain where this nuclear waste is "reprocessed". Reprocessing
involves a chemical process to separate the plutonium from the spent
fuel, leaving contaminated uranium and a tremendous volume of nuclear
waste.
While the exact terms of the contracts agreed between Japanese
utilities and the European reprocessing companies is kept secret, it
is believed that they require this plutonium, uranium and nuclear
waste to be shipped back from France and Britain to Japan. Some of
these return shipments have already occurred from France to Japan in
the last few years:
* the 1992 plutonium oxide transport on the Akatsuki Maru which
sailed to Japan via the Cape of Good Hope, Indian Ocean, Tasman Sea
and the South Pacific
* the 1995 high level nuclear waste (HLW) transport on the "Pacific
Pintail" which sailed to Japan via the East coast of South America,
Cape Horn and the South Pacific
* the 1997 transport of HLW on the Pacific Teal which sailed to
Japan via the Cape of Good Hope, the Indian Ocean, Tasman Sea, and
South Pacific
* the 1998 transport of HLW on the Pacific Swan which sailed to
Japan via the Caribbean Sea and Panama Canal
* the 1999 transport of HLW on the "Pacific Swan" which sailed to
Japan via the Caribbean Sea and Panama Canal
The Japanese government and industry committed to the plutonium
program in the 1970s when it signed "reprocessing" contracts with the
state-controlled plutonium companies British Nuclear Fuels (UK) and
COGEMA (France). Japan committed to these expensive contracts because
it intended to develop a new type of reactor--the Fast Breeder
Reactor--which would be plutonium fuelled and was supposed to generate
electricity while producing more plutonium than was started with.
Instead, Japan has failed to construct a single commercial breeder
reactor. In fact, the Monju breeder reactor which the Japanese
government opened in April of 1994, and which they said would prove
the commercial viability of such reactors, is now indefinitely
shut-down after it was the site of the worst nuclear reactor accident
in Japanese history in December 1995.
Despite statements of the Japanese government and industry about
plutonium guaranteeing Japan's energy future, no electricity is
currently produced in Japan from plutonium produced after
reprocessing. Instead, more than five tonnes of plutonium, including
the material aboard the Akatsuki Maru, are now stockpiled in Japan.
The Japanese government and industry are now scrambling to justify the
plutonium programme. Japan is now suggesting that some of the
plutonium can be mixed with uranium (MOX) and used in conventional
nuclear reactors. Given that these reactors were designed to use
uranium fuel alone, use of plutonium fuel will raise significant
additional safety risks for reactor operation, severe reactor
accidents and for the storage of nuclear waste. Plutonium fuel is
also estimated to be up to ten times more expensive than conventional
low enriched uranium fuel. The use of such weapons usable plutonium
fuel also raises significant security and proliferation risks at the
fuel fabrication, reactor, and waste storage facilities, and during
the transports linking these facilities.
The current shipment has been negotiated by Mitsubishi, Toshiba and
the Japanese power utilities TEPCO and KEPCO, and the plutonium fuel
is destined to be loaded in two conventional nuclear reactors at
Fukushima and Takahama.
Finally, despite the fact that Japan says it wants to get rid of the
weapons-usable plutonium stockpile is has been amassing, it continues
to have more plutonium separated in Europe and Japan and is
considering signing new contracts for plutonium separation for the
decades to come. Such plutonium programmes have signficant
implications for the international community's efforts to ban the
production and use of fissile material. Current discussions are
focused solely on the production of plutonium and highly enriched
uranium for so-called "military purposes". However, the wide-scale
production of plutonium and MOX fuel for commercial use would
seriously jeopardise the effective verification and implementation of
a fissile material ban.
Annex 2: The Transport Plan
As has been the case with past spent fuel, plutonium and nuclear waste
shipments, the Japanese, French and British governments are currently
with-holding essential information about their transport plans. No
information is being provided on the transport route to be taken,
preparation of emergency and salvage plans or on outstanding safety,
security and liability issues. Nor have the governments sought to
consult with and get the approval for these plans from en route
nations.
In addition, despite repeated requests, the Japanese government has
been unwilling to conduct an international Environmental Impact
Assessment of the forthcoming plutonium shipments as required under
customary international law and the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (articles 204, 205, 206).
Because the plutonium fuel is weapons-usable, it must be transported
under military security. However, the two vessels have been armed
only with light guns and water cannons -- in contrast to the 1992
Akatsuki Maru shipment of separated plutonium oxide, which had an
armed naval escort. The "civil" nuclear freighters will have 30mm
cannons and armed security guards on board, and will escort each
other. The shipping nations appear to want to save costs and give the
appearance that this shipment is somehow a routine commercial cargo.
In spite of these wholly inadequate security arrangements, the United
States -- which must sign off on the security arrangements for the
transport because the plutonium fuel is derived from US-origin uranium
-- has approved the transport plan.
The arming of the vessels creates an additional risk of accident,
however, as each freighter will carry an estimated seven tons of
highly explosive ammunition -- alongside an estimated 1,100 long tons
of fuel oil. In addition, Japanese officials have revealed that
instead of using new and purpose-constructed transport containers for
these plutonium fuel transports they will instead use old, used spent
fuel casks whose licenses have lapsed and whose operational history is
unclear.
The Pacific Pintail and Pacific Teal are currently at Barrow docks in
Cumbria, Britain, where they are awaiting sea trials before making the
journey to Japan. Information received by Greenpeace suggests that the
shipments could be made from Barrow and Cherbourg anytime between
mid-July and October. The transit would take approximately six
weeks.
The MOX fuel from the La Hague reprocessing plant, which has been
fabricated at a Belgian facility in Dessel, is currently due to be
transported from Belgium to France. Greenpeace drew public attention
to the inadequate safety and security arrangements around the first of
the MOX shipments from Belgium to France in May 1999, and the shipment
was subsequently delayed due to apparent French and Belgian political
concerns.
-------------------
From: "Shaun Burnie" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Organization: Greenpeace
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date sent: Tue, 13 Jul 1999 00:14:38 mez-1
Subject: first part of la hague transport underway
Copies to: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED],
[EMAIL PROTECTED],
[EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Dear All,
To confirm that the first transport of MOX fuel from la hague has
left the plant and is moving to the railway yard at Armanville, near
Valognes.
The transport convoy appears to be 2 TN-17 casks - that means half of
the plutonium 110kg, in 16 assemblies. Police escort, though no
details.
Departure from la hague is estimated at 10.30pm local time.
First transport Valognes arrived 11.55 local time the convoy
consisted of an estimated:
ten police vans
two police cars
two exceptional convoy vehicles,
8 security vans
two buses full of police
and security vans/buses - several
and the three trucks of MOX
GP video and still documented the arrival.
Thats it for the moment - regards - Cherbourg Team.
--Message-Boundary-10481
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From: "Media Japan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Organization: Greenpeace
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date sent: Mon, 12 Jul 1999 18:12:27 +0000
Subject: another nuclear accident in Japan
Dear all,
There was nuclear accident again in Japan, 6:05 am on 12th
July(Japanese time). 6:48am the plant was shut down manually.
According to Kyodo wire service 60tons of coolant water leaked,
(13:25) but leaking is still going on. According Reuters (18:20),
it has already more than 70tons.
(According to Kyodo)
leaking is 9.8tons per hour and when the pressure
of nuclear plant is going down, it will stop leaking.
JAPC will go to the accident site, check the leaking point and
cause of the accident when the nuclear plant gets cool down.
JAPC said there is no radioactive impact in the environment.
I added Reuters news story as below for your information.
Reuters 17:29
Japan Atomic Power Company said on Monday it had manually shut down
the NO.2 reactor at its Tsuruga nuclear power station due to a leak
of primary coolant water.
The reactor had leaked 46 tonnes of water as of 1:00 pm and still
appeared to be leaking at a rate of about four tonnes an hour, a
sopkeswoman for the company said.
The spokeswoman said cooling facilities at the 1.16gigawatt reactor
in Fukui prefecture on the Sea of Japan coast were being refilled to
the normal capacity of about 260tonnes.
The reactor was shut down following fire alarms and anomalies in
monitor indications at 6:48 am.
The ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) said accidnet
was rated 1 on the international Nuclear Event Scle (INES). A rating
of 1 is the third-lowest, following "out of scle" and 0, while 7 is
the most serious rating.
Japan Atomic Power said there was no radioactive impact on the
environment.
A MITI official said Japan's worst leak of primary coolant water,
which was radiated , was in 1979 when Kansai Electic Power Co Inc's
Takahama No.2 reactor leaked about 95tonnes.
There was also a leak about 55 tonnes of primary coolant water in
1991 at Kansai Electric's Mihama No.2 rector in 1991, the offical
added.
Althrough the Mihama leak was contained within water pipes, in the
incidents at Tsuruga on Monday and at Takahama in 1979 primary
coolant water leaked out of the water circulation system onto the
container floor, the MITI official said.
The Japan Atomic Power spokeswoman said it would be Monday evening
before personnel could actually enter the site for further
investigation.
end
noriko
Noriko Oyama
Press Officer
Greenpeace Japan
phone: 81 3 5351 5409
fax : 81 3 5351 5417
mobile:81 90 3470 7884
e-mail:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
--Message-Boundary-10481
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From: "Shaun Burnie" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Organization: Greenpeace
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date sent: Tue, 13 Jul 1999 16:02:35 mez-1
Subject: korean government meeting with Japan on pu shipment
Dear all,
It has been reported in an article in todays Asahi Shimbun (pg3 in
Kansai region) that the Korean government is preparing to ask
officially the Japanese government for information about the
upcoming shipment of MOX. It says that yesterday the Korean Ministry
of Trade and Foreign Affairs announced that they will officially ask
Japan about the route and for other information about the transport
at the Japan Korean Environment Common Committee
Meetings are to be held in Tokyo from the 15th of this month. The
meetings are scheduled to last for two days.
We will see what we can do to effect this meeting in advance
best regards - shaun
--Message-Boundary-10481--
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Salatiga 50711, I N D O N E S I A
phone / fax: +62 - 298 - 22418
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