All that spindoctoring shit had not been invented when Heidegger saw it coming.
adrian. Joseph Polanik wrote: > What is a Phenomenological Reality? > > Differentiating the Experiencer and the Experience. > > >3. What is the difference between the experiencer and the experience? > > >in the phenomenon of experiencing, the experiencer is this > >(first-person view) or that (third-person view) which experiences (via > >some mode of experiencing) the object of the experience. > > >Jud: The experiencer is NOT *a first person view* > > you've misunderstood. I was contrasting 'this' and 'that'. > > Heidegger defines daSein from a third person point of view, that > 'being-there', but says that any daSein should self-refer using the > first-person. any daSein which does so would have to translate > 'being-there' to this 'being-here'. > > similarly, in my answer to your question, I gave the first-person and > third-person variations. in the first person one might say 'I, *this* > which experiences, am an experiencer' while in the third person one > might say 'an experiencer is *that* which experiences'. > > >[Jud]: Therefore on what basis precisely do you posit an ontological > >difference betwixt a putative *I* and the catenulate conjunctive > >complex of combinatorial causative neurons that consist of: > > >[Joe]: I certainly do not posit an ontological difference in the > >Heideggerian sense of that phrase. > > [Joe]: in humanese, where 'ontological' is restricted to referencing > >realities of reality type 3, > > >Jud: Being an Englishman I prefer English please. > > Joe: as an American, so do I; but, that said, I prefer the precision of > humanese english over the ambiguity of vernacular english. > > >Jud: What in the name of Jesus are realities? > > Joe: relative to a linguistic frame of reference wherein 'reality' is > the root predicate, 'reality' and 'realities' perform the same function > as 'existent' and 'existents' perform relative to a linguistic frame of > reference wherein 'existent' is the root predicate. > > >Joe: it is possible to coherently posit a relation between an > >individual entity and a collective entity; for example, between being > >(the particular) and Being (the collective). > > >Jud: No such *relationship* exists > > in humanese, 'ontological reality' and 'existential reality' are defined > to be mutually exclusive. so no ontological reality exists and no > existential reality is a being. more simply, no being is an existent and > no existent is a being. > > in humanese, no one is prohibited from positing a relation between the > individual and the collective versions of being/Being; but, this > relation is not the ontological difference that Heideggerians speak of. > > >Jud: the difference between a (macro) individual and its collective of > >separate constituent cells is a mereological classifaction which has > >nothing at all to do with the human, elephant or star system concerned. > > >[Joe]: however, Heideggerians deny that this relationship is the same > >as Heidegger's concept of the ontological difference; and, I agree. > > >Jud: Why? This mereological difference is NOT an ontological difference > >it is merely a human classificatoy difference. The ontological > >difference is the so-called difference betwixt *pain* and a *Painful > >toe.* > > [Joe]: the difference between pain and the damaged toe, in my > terminology, the difference between the phenomenal reality (the > *experience* of pain (ie. the QUALIA)) and the meta-phenomenal reality > that causes the pain --- in this case, an existential reality, the > damaged or injured toe. > > [Joe]: I'm not convinced that the difference between the phenomenal and > the meta-phenomenal is same as the ontological difference as understood > by Heidegger. in the unlikely event that the Heideggerian ontological > difference is just the difference between the phenomenal and its > meta-phenomenal correlate(s), then it would turn out to be true that I > am advocating (in different terminology) what Heideggerians call an > ontological difference. > > >[Jud]: Why separate out a pronominal self-referential *I* which is a > >linguistically communicative symbol concerned with exterior interaction > >with others rather than with interior survival strategies from the rest > >of the body? How is a *reasoning* *I* or *self* any different > >existentially from the sensorially equipped, physically proactive - > >reactive, cellularly cooperative, somatically diverse, protectively > >evaluative, neurologically dynamic meaty actioning reasoner. > > >[Joe]: it depends on how you disambiguate the 'I' of vernacular english > >when translating the claim in question into humanese english using its > >subscripted pronouns. > > >Jud: It has nothing at all to do with *humanese English* - The question > >is quite simple does the pronoun *I* take for its nominatum the > >sensorially equipped, physically proactive - reactive, cellularly > >cooperative, somatically diverse, protectively evaluative, > >neurologically dynamic meaty actioning reasoner, or does it take the > >mediavalistic *mind* as it nominatum? > > due to the ambiguity in vernacular english as to the reality type of the > referent of 'I', the answer to your question depends on how your > noun-based terminology, 'mediavalistic mind', is disambiguated when > translated into the first-person pronoun based terminology of humanese > english. > > remember that, in humanese english, subscripted pronouns are defined so > that they may only refer to a referent of the reality type indicated by > the subscript. here is a question that may or may not help with > differential diagnosis: which reality type is 'mediavalistic mind' > defined to refer to? is it its own substance? > > if 'mediavalistic mind' refers to a meta-phenomenal entity (or alleged > meta-phenomenal entity) of reality type 3, then the appropriate pronoun > to use is 'I-3'. > > do you imagine that 'mediavalistic mind' refers to something that is > composed not of res extensa but res cogitans or some other non-physical > 'stuff', then you are defining 'mediavalistic mind' to refer to > realities of type 3. > > >[Joe]: I-2 suspect that you would say I-1 experience afterimages > >whereas I-2 would say I-2 experience afterimages. > > >[Joe]: so, from your point of view there is no difference between the > >'I' that reasons and the existential reality correlated with the > >experience of thinking. for me it is not so simple. > > >Jud: What is the *existential reality*? Where is THAT located? > > which existential reality? the one corresponding to the I-2? I-2 > previously indicated that I-2 have no idea as to the location of the > I-1, the neurological correlate of the experience of self-awareness; > and, you replied that it did not matter to you that scientists have not > yet identified the neurological correlate of the self-awreness that I-2 > --- that any I-2 --- undoubtedly experience. > > >Jud: If there is no ontological difference then you are not a trannie > >you are a full blown physicalist. > > I-2 am most certainly not a full-blown physicalist. I-2 believe we > already established that in discussing afterimages. I-2 use 'afterimage' > to refer to the patch of color I-2 experience seeing; but, you use > 'afterimage' to refer to the brain state I-1 have while I-2 experience > seeing that patch of color. > > >[Jud]: As a self-confessed, out of the cupboard transcendentalist > > >Joe: according to your definition of 'transcendentalist', about > >99.99999% of the population are transcendentalists. remember all it > >takes is the belief that 'afterimage' refers to a patch of color rather > >than to the neuro-electrochemical correlate of that colorful experience. > > >Jud: I do not count that as a viable argument for the 99.99999% are not > >all capable of understanding what the hell we are talking about and > >they have not had the question put to them in simple enough terms - in > >fact tahy have not had the question put to them at all. > > so, put the question to *them*. I've already answer it when I told you > that I refuse to accept your injunction to speak only about brainstates > and never about qualia. > > > Joe > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/epistemology?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
