Georges Metanomski wrote:
>Let's shelve for the moment Awareness and move to another allegedly
>most rigorous and exact area - the Set Theory. Now, the Set Theory is
>founded in the intuitive concept "Collection". What could you say about
>"Collection" in this sense of foundation of the Set Theory?
self-asserted self-awareness is self-verifying.
I posted about Axiomatic Set Theory, AST, in relation to self-awareness
during a dialogue with Professor Crifasi about 6 months ago; but,
perhaps, that thread wasn't cross-posted to the list whose mail you are
now reading; so, I'll summarize:
[1]: the assertion 'I am self-aware' is self-verifying for the reasons
previously given.
[2]: since nothing unreal is self-aware, it follows that I am real (in
some sense); and, one may reasonably follow up this insight by asking
'what sort of reality am I?'
[3]: the principle 'nothing unreal is self-aware' is intuitively
obvious; but, if a logical argument for it is required, one can be
given. it is derived from an assumption built into the foundations of
both predicate logic and axiomatic set theory: it is impossible to
attribute predicates to nothingness.
I take this assumption as the Axiom, IPN: it is Impossible to attribute
Predicates to Nothingness.
alternately, one can state this axiom in the jargon of AST: it is
impossible to attribute predicates to a member of the empty set ---
because there are no such members.
hence, if I can attribute a predicate to the referent of 'I' then the
referent of 'I' can not be a member of the empty set --- and, therefore,
must be real in some sense.
in making the self-verifying claim 'I am self-aware' I attribute a
predicate to the referent of 'I'. hence, it can not be the case that the
referent of I is nothing at all.
Joe
--
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. --- H-N Castaneda
@[EMAIL PROTECTED]@^@
http://what-am-i.net
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