[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Translating 'Cogito'
>Joe: translating 'cogito' as 'I think' is itself dubious.
>Jud: Literally translated "cogito" is Latin for "I think," - there is
>nothing remotely *dubious* about it.
>Jud: To arbitrarily and wilfully change the meaning of the words of an
>ancient language and twist its meanings as used by the writer of
>ancient texts such as that of Descartes in order to pervert its
>connotation to support and lend credence to some private doctrinal
>agenda is strictly inadmissible.
>Joe: this is a truly, scurrilous accusation.
>[Jud]: If all the extended meanings of *Think* claimed by Koyre were
>implicit in the 16th century version of Latin at the time, why did he
>himself have to spell out these extra verbs if they were already
>packaged in the one word THINK one by one to a readership that would
>already have been aware of them if they were already semantically
>packaged in the one word THINK?
it is true that Descartes repeatedly reminds his readers and
correspondants that he uses cogito derived words in a very expansive
way. that *may* indicate that he redefined those words to suit himself;
but, it *certainly* indicates that he intended just such an expansive
use --- one that is precisely conveyed by translating 'cogito' as 'I
experience'.
I am not the one who created that expanded definition of 'cogito'.
>>Joe: the case for translating 'cogito' as 'I experience' is based on
>>the fact that Descartes used it that way.
>Jud: In just the same way as Heidegger selects the more
>agenda-friendly, ontologically slippery *Being,* rather than the more
>explicit *existing* (or *living* in the case of animate objects) and
>the universal quantifying *is* rather than the existential quantifier
>*exists, *so Descartes (and you with your introduction of the
>experientio) introduced the expanded, more inclusive rendering of the
>verb *think* into his failed, would-be axiom.
one problem with Heidegger's taxonomy of all that allegedly is is that
he conflates reality types 1 and 2 (existing and experiencing) into one.
then, to add confusion to conflation he uses 'being' (which Descartes
had used for reality type 3) as the name of the melange of
existing/experiencing.
>[Jud]: En Passant. Neither Anscombe or Geach agreed with Koyre that
>the more extended version of *think* was appropriate for the cogito -
>although they did agree that such an extensional interpretation of the
>of the contemporary meaning of Think was valid.
>Descartes. Philosophical Writings ed and trans Anscombe & Geach.
>Introduction. p. xxxvii. n2. Edinburgh 1954. Routledge Taylor and
>Francis Group,
en passant!? I don't think so.
Anscombe and Geach translate most uses of cogito and cognate terms very
differently than, say, Cottingham et. al. you are free to argue that
Anscombe & Geach were incorrect to translate Descartes as they did; but,
it is not possible to claim that they did not agree with Koyre.
in their own translators' note, they say:
"The most important problem of a Descartes translation is the rendering
of the verbs cogitare and penser and their derivatives. Since Locke, the
traditional English renderings have been the verb think and the noun
thought. We have decided to abandon this tradtion, which seems to us to
run the rish of seriously risrepresenting what Descartes says. In
everday XVIIth-century French, pensee had a rather wider application
than in modern French; it was then natural, as it would not now be, to
call an emotion une pensee." [ p. xlvii]
>1) Descartes decided that he (like all humans) is *a res cogitans.
which phrase Anscombe and Geach translate as 'conscious being'.
>(a) *There is a contradiction in conceiving that that what thinks does
>not at the same time as it thinks, exist.*
A&G: "One who is experiencing cannot but exist while he is
experiencing." [Principles of Philosophy Part 1 Section 49]
and, as I mentioned in my previous post, they translate 'cogito; ergo,
sum' as 'I experience therefore I am'. [Principles of Philosophy Part 1
Section 9]
etc. etc. etc.
in fact, there is so little basis for your claim that you have to
distort the A & G translation in a rather blatant way.
>*Finally it is I who have sensations, or who perceive corporeal objects
>as it were by the senses. Thus I am now seeing light, hearing a noise,
>feeling heat. These things are false it may be said for I am asleep;
>but at least I seem to see, to hear, to be warmed. This cannot be
>false; and this is what is properly called my sensation; further,
>sensation, precisely so regarded is nothing but thinking.* [cogitare]
this is from the second meditation. it is a verbatim quote except for
the last word. you have 'thinking' but A & G have 'an act of
consciousness (cogitare).
Joe
--
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. --- H-N Castaneda
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http://what-am-i.net
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