Evidence is Good.... N9
On Sep 17, 7:54 pm, archytas <[email protected]> wrote: > If we believe there is a history of science, then it seems right to > believe much of the evidence for later theories is around when it is > construed in an earlier one we later come to modify or reject. > Examples would be that the evidence for Darwinism was around when we > had daft creationism, and for relativity in Newton's day - and in the > progressions since. In simple terms, under-determinism is expressed > in the general critical reasoning in the following: > > At the heart of the underdetermination of scientific theory by > evidence is the simple idea that the evidence available to us at a > given time may be insufficient to determine what beliefs we should > hold in response to it. In a textbook example, if I all I know is that > you spent $10 on apples and oranges and that apples cost $1 while > oranges cost $2, then I know that you did not buy six oranges, but I > do not know whether you bought one orange and eight apples, two > oranges and six apples, and so on. A simple scientific example can be > found in the rationale behind the sensible methodological adage that > “correlation does not imply causation”. If watching lots of cartoons > causes children to be more violent in their playground behavior, then > we should (barring complications) expect to find a correlation between > levels of cartoon viewing and violent playground behavior. But that is > also what we would expect to find if children who are prone to > violence tend to enjoy and seek out cartoons more than other children, > or if propensities to violence and increased cartoon viewing are both > caused by some third factor (like general parental neglect or > excessive consumption of Twinkies). So a high correlation between > cartoon viewing and violent playground behavior is evidence that (by > itself) simply underdetermines what we should believe about the causal > relationship between the two. But it turns out that this simple and > familiar predicament only scratches the surface of the various ways in > which problems of underdetermination can arise in the course of > scientific investigation - this from Stanford Encyclopeadia of > Philosophy online - I hope we are all familiar with the general line > of critical reasoning, at least in not assuming too much from what is > under consideration. > > No convincing general case has been made for the presumption that > there are empirically equivalent rivals to all or most scientific > theories, or to any theories besides those for which such equivalents > can actually be constructed. Our efforts to confirm scientific > theories go on amongst theories which are not empirically equivalent > but are equally (or at least reasonably) well confirmed by all the > evidence we happen to have in hand at the moment and so long as we > think that there is (probably) at least one such (fundamentally > distinct) alternative available we are in a transient predicament > whenever we are faced with a decision about whether to believe a given > theory at a given time. There is a convincing case for contrastive > underdetermination of theory by evidence, and that the evidence for it > is available in the historical record of scientific inquiry itself. > We think that our own scientific theories are considerably better > confirmed by the evidence than any rivals we have actually produced. A > central question is whether we should believe that there are well > confirmed alternatives to our best scientific theories that are > presently unconceived by us. And the primary reason we should believe > that there are is the long history of repeated transient > underdetermination by previously unconceived alternatives across the > course of scientific inquiry. In the progression from Aristotelian to > Cartesian to Newtonian to contemporary quasi-mechanical theories, for > instance, the evidence available at the time each earlier theory > dominated the practice of its day also offered compelling support for > each of the later alternatives (unconceived at the time) that would > ultimately come to displace it. > > My old bee-in-bonnet of the role of future memory and accurate history > in developing science (though I'm more interested in developing > society) other than as dogma has some of its explanation in this, > including a sense that we are not excluding values in science but > trying to develop better ones and in a process of development. I do > not believe theory is a individual mental product but more to do with > (or a product of) a commitment to 'evidence' over time past and future > and epistemological belief should be placed in this and not theory. > 'Evidence', of course, may not be as simple to define as in the > experiment of walking up to a guy with a large wet fish in hand, > saying uncomplimentary things about his mother and discovering your > solipsist reaction to the swing of the said fish in the moment in > which you experience your face. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/epistemology?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
