Hello Chaz I agree 100% with your post. Indeed the idealist position does not deny the existence of external objects. Instead, focus on the gap between them and direct knowledge or perception, being that gap structural by definition. How could be different anyway? Objects as perceived/known, can only be different from those addressed by the knower. And when the idealist states the external world does not exists, it is just to stress that difference, which is a good resource to make the point, and it certainly does not mean he/she is stupid and that s/he likes to step out the window from the 25th floor. But more than that, one could also say you dont even need subjectivity to justify that gap, DNA is also a sort of proof. Change the reader and you will change the being, or cheat it enough and you can produce insulin out of bacteria, whatever.
rgds On Jun 25, 4:41 am, chazwin <[email protected]> wrote: > In what way is Kant justifiably called a Subjectivist or Idealist? > > We are perfectly justified in maintaining that only what is within > ourselves can be immediately and directly perceived, and that only my > own existence can be the object of a mere perception. Thus the > existence of a real object outside me can never be given immediately > and directly in perception, but can only be added in thought to the > perception, which is a modification of the internal sense, and thus > inferred as its external cause … . In the true sense of the word, > therefore, I can never perceive external things, but I can only infer > their existence from my own internal perception, regarding the > perception as an effect of something external that must be the > proximate cause … . It must not be supposed, therefore, that an > idealist is someone who denies the existence of external objects of > the senses; all he does is to deny that they are known by immediate > and direct perception … . > —Critique of Pure Reason, A367 f. > > Given this statement, how is any position which asserts a Realist > position ever justifiable? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/epistemology?hl=en.
