Concept and Reference....Idea and Thing....Mind and Matter.... However the distinction is framed, they "operate" at under different "epistemological" conditions.... The first "aspect"... is subjective... (Concept, Idea, Mind) The second aspect... is objective... (Reference, Thing, Matter)
Seems pretty straight forward to me, and about as clearly and succinctly as I can phrase it... Do you remember my original "motto" from years back?... old ground... "I have never met a circle or it's diameter.... but your ass resembles them... like it or not, your ass stinks..". a circle is an idea... as is a diameter.... hence I have never met either... by "met" i mean that I have never encountered or run across either of them in the Real World through any of my senses. But I have definite "notions " of what they are and I can "represent" them symbolically... with a pencil and paper, for example... Your ass, on the other hand (anyone's ass) is a reference a matter "thing" I can experience in the Real World through my senses... I can see it and I can smell it.... like I said... it stinks..... What is so difficult in, at least, conceding this basic epistemological difference as a pretty good "working hypothesis"?.... to my experience.... it hasn't been disproven through experiment, yet..... So... Archytas... as a "realist"..... can you show me a Physical Circle and a Physical Diameter... along with all other commonly called Ideas or Concepts...? I think NOT. HAR HAR HAR HAR (all in good fun, of course). On Jun 26, 3:21 pm, archytas <[email protected]> wrote: > One has to say now that the role of what we term the unconscious has > more to do with science than we are allowing for even in our worst > rationalist fantasies about it. I am yet to meet a non-realist or > many of the other 'stuffs' I consider as real. Kant at least shows we > need to hold more balls together in some arguments to have much clue > on what matters. I suspect the problem with the term realism is > 'common language' in the sense of the lack of it other than in the > noise of clown society. 'Get real' being a general statement of the > idiot. We could understand much more of this from what we know of > animals than philosophers pretending not so to be. > > On Jun 26, 7:51 pm, nominal9 <[email protected]> wrote: > > > Hi Chaz.... > > Frankly, I consider Kant to have been the first of the > > Phenomenologists.... before Husserl, et al.... > > As a Nominalist-leaning person, myself.... Phenomenologists are the > > bane of my existence, I find that I have nothing that I agree with in > > common with them, epistemologically... our "views" are diametrically > > opposed.... > > I think we've had this discussion.... or parts of it.....before.... > > > Maybe you've seen that, when it comes to Kant's > > terminology....phenomenon and noumenon, especially....and the > > resulting Kant notions of the "essences" of knowledge..... > > > Well... that's just "spaced-out" Mumbo-Jumbo.... like being on a > > constant "drug-high".... when it comes to experiencing "things"..... > > > That's my own opinion , of course... and I've put it in a very > > "aggressively" critical, "common-language" form.... just to get you to > > think about it > > > On Jun 25, 3:41 am, chazwin <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > In what way is Kant justifiably called a Subjectivist or Idealist? > > > > We are perfectly justified in maintaining that only what is within > > > ourselves can be immediately and directly perceived, and that only my > > > own existence can be the object of a mere perception. Thus the > > > existence of a real object outside me can never be given immediately > > > and directly in perception, but can only be added in thought to the > > > perception, which is a modification of the internal sense, and thus > > > inferred as its external cause … . In the true sense of the word, > > > therefore, I can never perceive external things, but I can only infer > > > their existence from my own internal perception, regarding the > > > perception as an effect of something external that must be the > > > proximate cause … . It must not be supposed, therefore, that an > > > idealist is someone who denies the existence of external objects of > > > the senses; all he does is to deny that they are known by immediate > > > and direct perception … . > > > —Critique of Pure Reason, A367 f. > > > > Given this statement, how is any position which asserts a Realist > > > position ever justifiable? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/epistemology?hl=en.
