Gilles Henri wrote: >Indeed I think we agree on what is the key point. Let me precise my >position with respect to comp: I indeed think that conscious properties are >related to computational properties. What I try to argue is >1) that this computation can not be duplicated like an ordinary software >like "Word6", because it is completely embedded (i.e. constantly in >interaction with) an environment, and that, contrary to what is sometimes >stated, a proper REAL simulation of the external Universe is impossible >with a machine embedded in this very Universe.
With the negation of comp. Sure! >2) that our notion of identity is NOT based on the computational identity >but on the physical one (based on the apparent physical continuity of >classical worlds through a time ordering), the computational continuity >being just a secondary consequence of the physical one. In particular our >own computational properties are constantly changing with time due to our >increasing experience, although we consider that we are the same individual. With some physicalist hypothesis (known to be in contradiction with comp), sure! > >So you have in fact to POSTULATE that the physical reality is identical to >its computation, before arriving to this conclusion. This postulate is >acceptable, but it is really interesting only if it produces non trivial >results, for example demonstrating m(C)>>m(B).... I'm not sure I understand you here. If we succeed in demonstrating m(C)>>m(B), we don't need to postulate any physical realities at all. Remember that I postulate comp right from the start. >I am not working in this field, but you should admit that the "cognitive >scientists" have failed up to now to build a machine showing the slightest >evidence of consciousness, and to explain it properly by human people. They >may have missed something.... Correct but irrelevant, I think, for our theoretical investigation. A+ Bruno.