I see, it is a good attempt at restricting the difinition of identity but it has two main problems: 1. It excludes what Bruno and I would include. 2. Must each molecule be mapped on to another molecule in the subsequent universes one planck-time hence? How much deviation is allowed before we say that the correlation is so poor that it is not 'you' in that universe?
> -----Original Message----- > From: Gilles HENRI [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Tuesday, April 20, 1999 5:00 PM > To: Higgo James > Cc: '[EMAIL PROTECTED]' > Subject: RE: valuable errors > > À (At) 14:47 +0100 20/04/99, Higgo James écrivait (wrote) : > >No, I think that both are possible and (2) hapens every planck-time. But > as > >Jacques has rudely pointed out the problem is that we have yet to define > >'you'. > > > > Right. As there is no objective definition of individuality, you can > assume > many different ones. You are allowed to think that you can be a computer, > or that you were another person in another life, or even that you are any > other human being. What I propose is to RESTRICT the definition of > identity > to a set of organized subsystems of macroscopic (classical-like) worlds > that are physically continuous (i.e. connected by a chain of Planck times > with Planck length separations ) and hence which can be thought as a > temporal evolution of a single individual, including all possible quantum > branching points. This is quite comparable to the problem of determining > if > some branch belongs or not to some tree. This EXCLUDES the possibility of > discontinuous copies in a macroscopic world ("teleportation"), or rather > such copies wouldn't preserve the identity in this sense. So (1) is > excluded by definition. But it keeps the idea of many "you" in MWI (2). > > I think that Bruno himself thinks that this position is tenable. I agree > that you can adopt a larger definition of identity, making (1) possible, > although I think that it would inevitably lead you to accept that you > could > be also something VERY different from your present state, which I find > quite strange. I tried to convince you that if you expect that your copy > behaves EXACTLY like yourself in ANY circumstance, it imposes that he IS > yourself, i.e; you are unique in our world. If you don't think that, you > could also accept to commit suicide thinking that you will reincarnate on > Sirius, like the members of Solar Temple order. It is not logically > refutable, although most people agree that it is foolish. > > Gilles > > > >