On 14 xxx -1, Marchal wrote: > OK, so you agree that a computationalist could, in case it is > technologically feasible, use teletransport to "move" herself. > Remember that the "original" is destroyed, and "reconstituted" elsewhere. > > I guess you agree that if someone survives teletransport, she will still > survives teletransport in case of multiple and independent > reconstitutions. > > Now, you were saying that the "entrenched trivial" errors concerns the > measure issue. > > Could you tell me if there is already an "entrenched trivial error" for > those who believes, like myself, that if people tell us in advance that > there will be multiple reconstitutions, then, before teletransportation, > their "immediate" futur is undetermined ? > > This is what I like to call Mechanist or Computationnalist Indeterminism. > So my question is "do you believe in Mechanist Indeterminism ?".
The situation you described is completely deterministic, much like the MWI of QM. For all practical purposes, a person who is copied should expect their future selves to be effectively randomly chosen. If you want to talk about what is actually going on though, I don't even accept that 'individual identity' carries over from one time step of a computation to the next. It's just that the future self or selves are sufficiently similar to the current self to motivate an interest in his (or their) well being. - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/