On 14 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:
> OK, so you agree that a computationalist could, in case it is 
> technologically feasible, use teletransport to "move" herself.
> Remember that the "original" is destroyed, and "reconstituted" elsewhere.
> I guess you agree that if someone survives teletransport, she will still
> survives teletransport in case of multiple and independent 
> reconstitutions.
> Now, you were saying that the "entrenched trivial" errors concerns the 
> measure issue.
> Could you tell me if there is already an "entrenched trivial error" for 
> those who believes, like myself, that if people tell us in advance that 
> there will be multiple reconstitutions, then, before teletransportation, 
> their "immediate" futur is undetermined ?
> This is what I like to call Mechanist or Computationnalist Indeterminism. 
> So my question is "do you believe in Mechanist Indeterminism ?".

        The situation you described is completely deterministic, much like
the MWI of QM.
        For all practical purposes, a person who is copied should expect
their future selves to be effectively randomly chosen.
        If you want to talk about what is actually going on though, I
don't even accept that 'individual identity' carries over from one time
step of a computation to the next.  It's just that the future self or
selves are sufficiently similar to the current self to motivate an
interest in his (or their) well being.

                         - - - - - - -
              Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
       Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
            My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

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