Fritz Griffith wrote to Russell:

>I'd like to hear just one good reason why you are dismissing these ideas.  
>You seem to have a lot of ignorance towards solipsism (whatever exactly that 
>is), yet you don't give any reasons why.  As best as I can understand, you 
>think my ideas are crossing too far into philosophical territory, where 
>nothing gets accomplished.  This often happens when too many assumptions are 
>made.  I took the opposite approach, however; I made no assumptions, and 
>used logic and reasoning to draw my conclusions.  Please point out just 
>where this theory goes wrong.

Idealisme is the Platonist idea that only ideas exists.

There is a widespread confusion between two kind of idealism.

1) There is solipsism, sometimes called "subjective idealism". It is
(as James Higgo said) the doctrine that I am dreaming, that I am the only
builder of reality, and all other people are just zombie.
This is a ridiculous doctrine, although it can be used to illustrate
some philophical point, like the concept of zombie.
It is a ridiculous doctrine, because a doctrine is something you
communicate, and why should someone try to communicate things to
zombie. So solipsisme (like some strong form of positivism) is

2) There is all form of objective idealism. Some "mind-like"
predicates are taken as more fundamental than matter or physicalist
predicates. It can be number (Pythagorism) mathematical structure 
(Platonism), or extravagant set of mortal to god-like entities
(like in some Indian idealist school).

Reading Griffith's post, unlike Russell, but like Higgo, I don't have 
concluded that Fritz Griffith was solipsist, though. It seems to me he
defended a sort of objective idealism (like me BTW), even if his use 
of the word "memory" is a little vague.

But is not the discussion-list a tool for helping us to make
our ideas clearer?

Concerning the (logical or physical, whatever) link between
memories, observer-instant, worlds, etc. This is a very difficult
matter. I say a little more in the post I will send to Jacques Mallah.


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