Wei Dai wrote: >Given the MWI or one of the "everything" theories we've discussed, the >universe must contain multiple observers who have exactly the same >memories and experiences as you do. Should you identify with all of them, >or should you think, "I am one of these people, but I don't know which"? > >I think the following thought experiment shows the latter is more >appropriate ...
I have the same understanding. Nevertheless I would like to try to make something a little more precise. Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that there are two and only two identical non-interacting and non-interfering newtonian-like universes. So there are two copies of you, one in each universe. In this situation you can say: "I am one of these people, but I don't know which" You can even say "I am one of these people, I don't know which, AND I don't care" But suppose that in the course of your "life time", the two universes "diverge" for some reason, so that a detectable (in principle) difference appears. In that case, even if the difference is not detected, you MUST say "I am one of these people, but I don't know which", and you must take that into account if you hope to describe a coherent way to quantify the indeterminism coming from the "everything" axiom. The "probabilities" depends on the relative proportion of relatively undistinguishable environments. Do you see what I am trying to say ? Do you agree ? Bruno
