Levy wrote:

>Marchal wrote:
>> It is better to read (change in capital):
>>   <<This is of course still countable when you look at the domain
>> from a third person point of view. But, as you aknowledge in
>> question 7, the delays does not count for the first person, so
>> the domain of 1-indeterminacy, which BEARS ON first persons EXPERIENCE
>>  is, thanks of that delays elimination, given by the
>> union (which is just the set theoretical interpretation of the or)
>> of all portion of UD* (the execution of the UD, an infinite
>> three dimensional cone in case the UD is implemented in a
>> two dimensional cellular automaton) in which my "preparing coffee"
>> state appear. (Reread that sentence slowly, I have written
>> it slowly, and without doubts it's too long).>>
>> So it is a third person measure on first person experiences.
>I read the sentence many times and it still does not make sense to me.
>Should I read it again?

Read it three times at breakfast, and one time in the evening
jumping the parenthesis.

Ok, ok. My diagnostic is that either you have forget the question
7 or 8, (see below) or you are forgetting what the UD does.

>What is:
>"the union of all portion of UD*  in which my "preparing coffee" state

Suppose that the UD is written in Fortran. I guess you know what the
trace of a program is. 

UD* is the infinite trace of the UD. It is describe by the
sequence of its subsequent states (as a program fortran). 

It is an infinite tree describing all possible computations in fortran.
(which includes fortran simulation of all program in Lisp, all Fortran
simulation of the COBOL version 5.3 emulation of all linear 
all the unitary transformations, etc.

Some of those computations will generate the 3-states corresponding to my 
"preparing coffe 1-state". Because we accept comp. Now if I prepare a
cup of coffee, my brain will go through a sequence of states (third person
describable computational state, at the right level of description
of myself). and I have pick one of those state---like in a duplication 

So the UD generates that state eventually (by going through a computation
which emulates my doing or dreaming of doing that cup of coffe).

The UD will generates that state eventually. Let us say in 10^googol
years (or steps). Our poor "universe" has disappeared, but we don't 
care because the UD run in Plato Heaven, or if you prefer, 
the whole UD* (the trace of the UD) lies staticaly but completely 
in Plato heaven). UD* is the block "mindscape" (mindscape borrowed to
Rudy Rucker's "Infinity and the Mind".).

And we don't care of the number of steps and of the time that UD would 
take to get that states because, as first person we cannot be aware
of those delays. Ok?

Please reread ten billions times, after lunch, the question 7 and 8.
Especially 8. (copy and past from  
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2992.html  below)

Note in passing that a copy and paste is a duplication without
annhilation of the original. 

The apparition in UD* of that third person description of the precise
state "where is my cup now?" (occuring when I am preparing my
cup of coffee (existing by comp)) is provided by the fact that
the UD generates all computations.

Saying yes to 7 and 8, makes that "event", executed by the UD
equivalent with a delayed reconstitution without demolition of the 

So with comp you *must* bet that at each instant you are copy and paste
somewhere in your domain of indeterminacy.

But, after a much longer time (much 
longer that 10^googol (the DU *dovetails*, so that it has a lot of work
while generating and executing the other programs) it generates a new
reconstitution of that states, so he builds little by little your
entire domain of 1-indeterminacy. The fact that the DU builds the
reconstitutions so slowly does not change the first person
experience because of the non awareness of the delay.

So when I am preparing my coffee cup, if I want to predict my next
possible instant, I must have a measure on the set of computational
histories generated by the DU going through the state corresponding
to my particular  "preparing my coffee cup" state. Or a measure
on all the "reconsitution" in UD*.

We just cannot care that some of those reconstitution appears
at step n1, some other at step n2, other at step n3, ....
The domain of reconstitution will be the union of all the portion
(subset or substring or subspace, or whatever
depending on the choice of representation)
... portion containing the virtual (or arithmetical) reconstitution.

Find a LISP interpreteur, run the UD at
If you don't like LISP, write yourself a UD in COBOL (why not)
Run it.
Stop it after two days. You have a portion of UD*.
Stop it after three days, you get a bigger portion of UD*.
By comp there is a day it will generate (and "reconstitute" de 
facto) my coffee-state of mind (the 3-comp state corresponding
for that state which exist.

If you answer yes to question 8, you should understand
why it is not necessary to
annihilate me when I am in that state, here in Brussels, for
making myself survive somewhere in UD*. 

Even if there is a "real physical universe", if you accept comp, 
you can bet the next instant that you have been copy and past in UD*.
So it is preferable to accept we have never leave it.

The only way to hunt the white rhabbits is to extract
Turing tropically the stability of regularities.

All this a priori. No doubt some equivalence quotient can be
attempted relatively, and some structure can exists on those
first person view of the computational neigborhood.
(And that happen indeed in the arithmetical translation of
the UDA).

>Is the cone in space, time, or what? Why three dimensions?

3 = 2 (because of the two dimensionality of the chosen CA (for exemple
game of life)- + 1 (time step). Little more below.

>not four or five? Where are these dimensions coming from?

>From the choice of cellular automata for describing the "programs"

>The sentence is
>not too long... it's just that it assumes too much background.

Sorry. (I was talking to Joel, Please look Joel'CA animation
which illustrates. But no problem keeping COBOL. For running
a UD any UM is good enough ...). 

>does UD* relate to UD? Is it the complement, the conjugate, the inverse, or

Yes I should have recall that. See above. It is just the trace of the UD.
A description of its execution. An infinite tree, or graphe, or set,
or cone, according to the representation you prefer.

>In any case, the whole issue of restricting an implementation to a
>particular cellular automaton in any dimensional configuration is abhorrent
>to me. 

A particular universal one which generates all executions in all
language. The choice of the universal system does not matter. Why not
a CA?  

>If finite inputs are considered any  automaton can be replaced with a
>huge look up table. 

Not those with growing memories. In particular not the universal

>And as any electrical engineer knows, any automaton,
>Turing machine or computer can be implemented by circuits consisting solely
>of  NAND gates (with additional initialization levels of 0 and 1.) That's
>it. Just NAND gates. Pure logic. No three dimensional cones or any other
>kinds of cones.

Yes but please give it as much rubber, space, virtual memory, etc,
as long it generated UD*.

This is just a question of language. I was talking CA with Joel, because
he talks CA.

Do you know the game of life. The fact that the game of life is
universal makes it (for me) a perfect way for talking on UD and UD*.

The UD, in the game of life,  is a finite life pattern. 
And its trace is just the sequence
of evolution step put on top of each other. Of course the pattern
extends itself 3-dimensionaly (it generates all programs, and 
runs more and more executions).

You stop it after one day. You get a truncated cone.
Two day, a bigger one. etc.
UD* is the infinite cone. It is just a representation. No problem
choosing nand circuits, quantum nor circuits, or cobol version x.

I hope this helps. Tell me. 


===================== Question  7  &  8 =================
from http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2992.html

Question 7: You are at Brussels (let us say), ready for a duplication WM.
Let us consider the two following 3-experiments/1-experiences:
1) just the simple duplication WM, where the W and M reconstitutions are
made simultaneously.
2) A duplication WM where an arbitrary reconstitution delay is made at 

Do you agree that again the two sets of 1-experiences remains unchanged
(from a 1-pov), although they are 3-different?
Put in another way, do you agree that if we quantify the WM 
by a uniform probability distribution, then you should do the same for
the second experiment.

That question is a mix of question 3 and question 5.
The following question is question 7 with a null delay.

Question 8: Let us consider the simple teleportation Sofia Brussels.
Except that now we don't destroy the original at Sofia. Or, if you prefer
we detroy it and rebuild at the same place in zero time.
Do you agree that in case P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 in the WM duplication then
P(S) = P(B) = 1/2 in the Sofia Brussels teleportation without destruction
of the original?

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