Joel:

>Bruno:
>
>> Your frank aknowledgment of the necessary 1-ignorance in self-
>> multiplication is quite moving, Joel, but don't you see where we 
>> are leading to?
>
>Let me guess... Is it Moscow?  
>No - wait.  Is it Washington?

>;)
:-)


>Honestly, I'm trying not to think too hard about the whole 
>argument yet.  I'm just trying to answer your questions, one step at
>a time.

It seems to me that's the right thing to do. And you *can* 
change your mind how many times you want. 
You can even, like some, just drop out comp at the end.

>Yes, I agree.  I don't see what difference a delay can make to the 
>first-person experience, yet from the third-person point of view, we
>obviously know that some delay has been introduced.

OK.


>> Question 8: Let us consider the simple teleportation Sofia 
>> Brussels.  Except that now we don't destroy the original at Sofia. 
>> Or, if you prefer we detroy it and rebuild at the same place in 
>> zero time.
>>
>> Do you agree that in case P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 in the WM duplication 
>> then P(S) = P(B) = 1/2 in the Sofia Brussels teleportation 
>> without destruction of the original?
>
>I think this is fine, but I admit - I'm getting a little confused 
>by all the cities.  Did we start in Sofia for the Washington-Moscow 
>experiment?  


Sure. In my mind it was Brussels, but that's not relevant.
It is certainly more easy for you to start from Sofia indeed.


>And in this new experiment, we are starting in Sofia 
>again, but one copy remains in Sofia and the other is sent to 
>Brussels, right?

Yes. Some people would say here that the "copy" at Sofia
is should remain the original. But then indeed delays would
play a role for the first person, and then they should
bactrack and say no to a preceeding question.

>If this is correct, then again, I cannot see what difference any of 
>the telportation or delay makes.  In general, I cannot predict 
>where I will be in the next moment - whether it be Washington, 
>Moscow, Sofia, Brussels, or Cairo.  Given any two alternatives, the 
>probability is equal that I could end up at either one.
>
>Am I following you correctly?

Yes.

Do you realise now that not only we have a form of 
1-indeterminacy but we have also a sort of 1-nonlocality.

To predict the result of a "physical experiments" (just because
this need the first person aknowlegment of where the apparatus
needle is) you must take into account that you are *not* 
reconstituted in a similar state somewhere in the whole ...
what, block universe?, Plato heaven?


The next question is easy, especially to someone saying about
himself that he is "software".

Question 9: Do you agree that, because we "are software" (at the
right level of description) there exists, in principle, virtual
simulation of Moscow and Washington sufficiently precise so that
from a first person point of view, we cannot distinguish (at least
for a time) those virtual realities from "real Moscow" and/or 
"real Washington"? 
And so do you agree that the way of quantifying 1-indeterminacy
is invariant if we substitute real environment by virtual one, or
if we mix them ...

After question 10, Sunday Holliday!

Question 10: Let us suppose, for the sake of the argument, that
we are indeed inhabiting a "physical" universe (grand-mother physics!)
and let us suppose, still for the sake of the argument, that that
universe is always expanding and creating new materials so that it is
possible to make running the UD (or your UCA). That running never 
stops, that is why I ask for an ever expanding universe.

So let us run it.

Do you agree that, in that case, for any experience/experiment you 
intend to do, here and now, to predict your immediate personal 
futur (this includes the result you see when observing the needle),
you must take into account (i.e. the domain of 1-indeterminacy is given
by) all the virtual reconstitutions (and the computational stories
going through it) of yourself generated by the UD?


Bruno

Reply via email to