Bruno: > Do you realise now that not only we have a form of 1-indeterminacy > but we have also a sort of 1-nonlocality.
Yes, from the first-person point of view. Though I would try to argue that the third-person point of view must always remain local. Note: If you find that remark controversial, feel free to defer that discussion until later. For now, I would just like to follow your argument. > Question 9: Do you agree that, because we "are software" (at the > right level of description) there exists, in principle, virtual > simulation of Moscow and Washington sufficiently precise so that > from a first person point of view, we cannot distinguish (at least > for a time) those virtual realities from "real Moscow" and/or > "real Washington"? > > And so do you agree that the way of quantifying 1-indeterminacy > is invariant if we substitute real environment by virtual one, or > if we mix them ... Yes, this is fine by me. As I've said, I also believe our immediate world IS virtual. In fact I'm not sure there is any difference between real and virtual. In my mind, everything is real. Or everything is virtual. It doesn't matter. But maybe this isn't the place to discuss that. So please continue... > Do you agree that, in that case, for any experience/experiment > you intend to do, here and now, to predict your immediate > personal futur (this includes the result you see when observing > the needle), you must take into account (i.e. the domain of > 1-indeterminacy is given by) all the virtual reconstitutions (and > the computational stories going through it) of yourself generated > by the UD? Yes, this sounds reasonable. I would agree: In general, it's not possible to predict one's future. Anything is possible... so nothng is probable. But we can still *hope* for certain futures. ;-) Joel