> Your frank aknowledgment of the necessary 1-ignorance in self-
> multiplication is quite moving, Joel, but don't you see where we 
> are leading to?

Let me guess... Is it Moscow?  
No - wait.  Is it Washington?

;) Honestly, I'm trying not to think too hard about the whole 
argument yet.  I'm just trying to answer your questions, one step at
a time.

> Question 7: You are at Brussels (let us say), ready for a 
> duplication WM.  Let us consider the two following 3-experiments/
> 1-experiences:
> 1) just the simple duplication WM, where the W and M 
> reconstitutions are made simultaneously.  
> 2) A duplication WM where an arbitrary reconstitution delay is 
> made at Moscow.
> Do you agree that again the two sets of 1-experiences remains 
> unchanged (from a 1-pov), although they are 3-different?

Yes, I agree.  I don't see what difference a delay can make to the 
first-person experience, yet from the third-person point of view, we
obviously know that some delay has been introduced.

> Question 8: Let us consider the simple teleportation Sofia 
> Brussels.  Except that now we don't destroy the original at Sofia. 
> Or, if you prefer we detroy it and rebuild at the same place in 
> zero time.
> Do you agree that in case P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 in the WM duplication 
> then P(S) = P(B) = 1/2 in the Sofia Brussels teleportation 
> without destruction of the original?

I think this is fine, but I admit - I'm getting a little confused 
by all the cities.  Did we start in Sofia for the Washington-Moscow 
experiment?  And in this new experiment, we are starting in Sofia 
again, but one copy remains in Sofia and the other is sent to 
Brussels, right?

If this is correct, then again, I cannot see what difference any of 
the telportation or delay makes.  In general, I cannot predict 
where I will be in the next moment - whether it be Washington, 
Moscow, Sofia, Brussels, or Cairo.  Given any two alternatives, the 
probability is equal that I could end up at either one.

Am I following you correctly?


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