Joel wrote:

>Bruno:
>> Sorry for the delay, but I am web-connected only at work, and at
>> work ..., well I have to work, sometimes :-)
>
>Yes, I know how that goes!
>
>> OK. I see you *are* a "computationalist" !
>
>Yes, it sounds like I am. :)
>
>And I think I am comfortable with all of the situations you have presented.
>(surviving duplication, etc.)
>
>> Here is question 6. Perhaps the first not so obvious one. Do you
>> agree that, if I ask you at Brussels, before the Washington-Moscow
>> duplication experiment: "Where will you *feel* to be after the
>> experiment will be completed?" that although you can answer "you will
>> see me at Washington and at Moscow", your first person diary will
>> either contain "I am at Moscow" or I am at Washington" so that you
>> cannot predict with certainty where you will feel to be?"
>
>Yes.. if I understand you correctly, I think you are correct.
>
>In general, there's no way I can tell where I will be next.


Formidable. Some people find the question 6 difficult if not meaningless.
This means that you understand  the comp 1-indeterminacy. It is 
just the fact that in a self-duplication experiment W M, you cannot 
tell where you 1-will be next (although you can tell where you 3-will be
next). {W, M} is the domain of indeterminacy ("definition").

But if there is an 1-indeterminacy, there is a hope, at least, to quantify
on some domain, that 1-indeterminacy.

Why should we quantify that 1-indeterminacy? 

Practical reason: well, I'm sure you should suit the European 
Teleportation
Link Service Inc. in case you learn that the post they used, sold copy of 
you
to perverse owners of virtual Sodome and Ghomore ... (Vivid image for 
showing
the meaningfullness of the question 6). There are risks to minimize.

But there is a much more fundamental reason to isolate that 
quantification.
Your frank aknowledgment of the necessary 1-ignorance in 
self-multiplication
is quite moving, Joel, but don't you see where we are leading to?

The way to quantify the indeterminacy is the unknown. Although we can 
argue
that the {W, M} duplication gives a sort of perfect 1-coin, simple 
probabilty
reasoning leads quickly to hard problems. 

I still keep questioning you, because I need to show some invariance 
property of *any* form of quantification a computationalist can agree
with.


Question 7: You are at Brussels (let us say), ready for a duplication WM.
Let us consider the two following 3-experiments/1-experiences:
 
1) just the simple duplication WM, where the W and M reconstitutions are
made simultaneously.
2) A duplication WM where an arbitrary reconstitution delay is made at 
Moscow.

Do you agree that again the two sets of 1-experiences remains unchanged
(from a 1-pov), although they are 3-different?
Put in another way, do you agree that if we quantify the WM 
1-indeterminacy
by a uniform probability distribution, then you should do the same for
the second experiment.

That question is a mix of question 3 and question 5.
The following question is question 7 with a null delay.


Question 8: Let us consider the simple teleportation Sofia Brussels.
Except that now we don't destroy the original at Sofia. Or, if you prefer
we detroy it and rebuild at the same place in zero time.
Do you agree that in case P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 in the WM duplication then
P(S) = P(B) = 1/2 in the Sofia Brussels teleportation without destruction
of the original?

Bruno

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