Saibal Mitra wrote:
>You could object that in the first case your consciousness is somehow
>transferred to a different person (you ``jump´´ to a different branch that
>separated from the dying branch before you were diagnosed), but I would say
>that the surviving person has the same consciousness the original person
>would have if you cured his disease and erased all memory of having the
Perhaps. But if you do that move, everyone is resurrected in everyone, and
there is only one person in the multiverse. I don't know. James Higgo
was more radical on this, he defended the idea of zero person.
With just comp this issue is probably undecidable. I guess comp (perhaps
QM too) can lead to a vast variety of incompatible but consistent point of
view on those matter. Comp is compatible whith a lot of personal
possible interpretations of what is identity. What is possible to prove
with comp is the non normative principle according to which personal
identity is *in part* necessarily a matter of personal opinion.
What remains to do is to compute the "real" probabilities to backtrack with
amnesia compare to the probability to quantum/comp-survive big injuries.
I doubt we have currently the tools to do those computations.