Jacques Mallah wrote:

> >From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >Jacques Mallah wrote:
> >  `` I have repeated pointed out the obvious consequence that if that
> >true, then a typical observer would find himself to be much older than
> >apparent lifetime of his species would allow; the fact that you do not
> >yourself so old gives their hypothesis a probability of about 0 that it
> >the truth.  However, they hold fast to their incomprehensible beliefs.
> >
> >According to FIN, however, the probability of being alive at all is
> >zero, which contradicts our experience of being alive.
>     Whatchya mean?  I wouldn't mind acquiring a new argument against FIN
> add to the ones I give, but your statement doesn't appear to make any

You wrote earlier that consciousness can't be transferred to a copy. But
consciousness isn't transferred, the copies had the same consciousness
already because they were identical.

I would say: I exist because somewhere I am computed. You appear to say that
(forgive me if I am wrong) I must identify myself with one computation. Even
an identical computation performed somewhere else will have a different

My objection is that the brain is constantly changing due to various
processes. The typical timescales of these processes is about a millisecond.
FIN thus predicts that I shouldn't find myself alive after a few


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