>From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >You wrote earlier that consciousness can't be transferred to a copy. But >consciousness isn't transferred, the copies had the same consciousness >already because they were identical.
No, they weren't _identical_. They were different people, who happened to have the same type of experiences and the same brain design. >I would say: I exist because somewhere I am computed. You appear to say >that (forgive me if I am wrong) I must identify myself with one >computation. Even an identical computation performed somewhere else will >have a different identity. Ok, although I would say to be more precise that you should identify yourself with an implementation of a computation. A computation must be performed (implemented) for it to give rise to consciousness. At this point I would like to reiterate something I have stated in the past. We all agree, I think, that not all computations have the same measure associated with them. But what you don't seem to realize is the implication of that fact: the mere existance of the abstract computation is not what is associated with measure of consciousness, so the number of implementations must be what determines the measure. That's why "leaping" is a necessary part of the Fallacious Immortality Nonsense (FIN). The mind must be associated with an implementation, and if it termintates that measure then is said to (in effect) leap to the remaining implementations. (Although, as I have also said, in that case the remaining implemementations would really be of a different computation.) This also means that knowing the current situation would not be enough, for one who believes the FIN, to in principle determine the measure distribution either at that time or any time in the future. In other words, the FIN requires mind-like hidden variables. >the brain is constantly changing due to various processes. The typical >timescales of these processes is about a millisecond. True. >FIN thus predicts that I shouldn't find myself alive after a few milliseconds. I'm guessing here that you misunderstood what I meant by "FIN". By FIN I mean that belief which some have called "QTI". So I guess you are attacking my position, but I don't see on what grounds. Suppose that your current implementation is indeed localized in time, and that at other moments you are considered to be a different person. (It's really just a matter a definition, especially if input is allowed.) So what? All that means is that the old "you" sees only that moment. Now there is a new "you" seeing this moment. So if you want to just define yourself to be a one-moment guy, then indeed you are no longer with the living. By the same token, the would be a new guy in your body and (hypothetically, not that you would) he'd be the one typing nonsense like "I'm still here". - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://hammer.prohosting.com/~mathmind/ _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp