Jesse Mazer has written
>If we abandon the idea of an
>absolute probability distribution, we have no hope of explaining why I am
>this particular type of observer-moment experiencing this particular type of
>universe, and we can only explain why my future experience will have a
>certain amount in common with my current experience (assuming that's what
>the conditional probability distribution actually predicts).
And I have answered:
<<But that is what each observer-moment can ask an explanation for. The
duplication WM experience illustrates that such question are senseless.
It is like "why am I in W" or "Why am I in M". With comp we can predict
that those questions will be asked, but there are no answers. We get
sort of necessary contingent propositions. No?>>
I realise such a sentence can be misunderstood. It is only *those*
questions (that is question of self-localisation in differentiating
which admit no answers with comp. But a lot of questions admit answers.
In particular I believe that it is possible to explain why at any
observer-moment we have that feeling of belonging to a space-time
history including the qualia feeling and the measure of quanta.
With the comp. hyp. we can "define" an observer-moment as a modal
situations with a neighborhood of similar situations. Each situation
defines the set of possible consistent neighborhood, and in each
situation the machine can anticipate those possible consistent extensions.
The machine can even distinguish communicable and uncommunicable
quality of those extensions (cf G, G*).
I mean the feeling of being spotted could perhaps be explained, and
certainly is in need for an explanation.