George Levy wrote:

>Let me propose a conjecture and let us see how far we can go with it:
>"Morality is the creation, protection and preservation of information.
>Immorality is the destruction of information."

I agree very much. Even threat of destruction is immoral. I think
pain is linked with anticipation of the destruction of information.
Hidding information can be immoral too in some situation.

>In classical religious terms this fits pretty well with the Ten
>Commandments. Lying, killing, bearing false witness destroys
>information. Adultery messes up social order (information). Honoring
>parents, protect and preserves their wisdom and  honors them as creator
>(of information). Meta Commandments include observing the Sabbath which
>honors creation itself and the first three Commandments which honor the
>Creator (of world information). 
>As an aside, let me say that in the modern context the destruction of
>the environment is immoral because it results in a decrease in
>biodeversity (world information). Conversely, work that generates
>information is very moral. I like to think that engineers are very moral
>individuals (I am one :-)) because they create new thing that do not
>exist in nature.  But if you really think about it, any work that
>generates a desirable service or product of benefit to society is in
>fact adding information to the world and is therefore moral.
>In response to Spudboy, we could define murder as killing that results
>in the destruction of information. Killing that results in the creation,
>preservation or protection of information is not murder. For example, A
>lion killing an antelope does so to survive. This action preserves
>biodiversity, allows the lions to continue as a specie and shapes the
>evolution of lions and antelopes (faster running, better senses of
>hearing, sights etc...) In short this action is necessary for the
>creation (evolution) of the fauna.
>The Taliban destruction of the statues of Buddah, on the other hand was
>evil because its aim was to reduce cultural diversity in Afghanistan.

I agree. Making women mute is also a way to destroy or hide information.

>The Taliban operate within a very inflexible system. Bruno would call it
>G. Our system on the other hand is much more flexible and adaptable.
>Because our way of life allows a continuous adaptation we cannot be
>described as a G. -- WE ARE THE TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES! Clearly we present
>a threat to the terrorists: OUR WAY OF LIFE SHOWS THAT THEIR G IS
>INCONSISTENT! In an evil attempt to restore their consistency, they
>attempt to eliminate our way of life. They won't succeed. We shall
>adapt. The world will end up better with more information.

In term of G/G* the two enemies of the UTM I described were those
machines which communicates they are consistent ([]<>t), the
machines which communicates they are inconsistent ([][]t). 
And then there are the traditional communicator of the false ([]t).
Among those are the "mad machine", "the wrong machine" the "dreaming
machine", and the lier. Your expression "their G" is ambiguous.
Of course any machine or entity feeling free to ask and talk is a
threat for totalitarian power.

>Now, how does this conjecture fits with the MWI?
>The Plenitude contains zero information. No matter what you do, the
>total amount of information will not change. For example, performing a
>good action, merely means that you allow your consciousness NAVIGATES
>the plenitude to a world where you have performed a good action. Other
>branching to counterfactual "bad action worlds" also exist but YOU have
>not NAVIGATED there. Other you's  (Yoush) have navigated there. As you
>can see, making decision in the plenitude can be reduced to the concept
>of NAVIGATION. You choose a branch, but yoush choose all branches.

>Thus the ABSOLUTE information of the world does not change NO MATTER

I am not sure. Locally: I think that making a good action 
augment the probability you and your relative will live in
a branch benefiting the action. From an absolute 3-pov you are right,
but we are not really living at that level.

>It seems therefore that just like everything else in our world (all
>physical entities) the only type of morality that matters is morality as
>seen by the first person. We now enter the realm of first person and
>third person perception and relativity.

Ah! OK then.

>To go any further I must now define the concept of objective world in
>relative terms. Objective worlds are worlds which share frames of
>reference "close enough" to the first person world as to be
>indistinguishable from it. 

This is an interesting idea which could help us for defining
the first person plural. I interpret your "worlds" as histories though.

>First and third person perceptions are
>identical when the third persons live in such objective worlds. First
>and third person perceptions differ (as in Quantum Suicide QS or FIN)
>when the frames of reference are too far apart.

I am not sure there could be third person perception. May be I miss
something. Perhaps you mean the first person plural which indeed
is localy third person and is linked to continua of very similar
histories (which interfere from the 1-plural point of view). OK then.

>I would like to make a distinction between absolute morality and
>objective morality. As I explained above absolute morality does not
>exist - absolute information remains at zero no matter what. Objective
>morality on the other hand does because objective worlds do exist.
>Objective information can change.

OK if you still interpret "objective worlds" as shared continua of
near computational histories (with comp, sorry).

>Thus insofar as there are objective worlds, there is objective morality.
>Destroying a specie or a person to reduce diversity in the world is
>objectively immoral. 

Transforming information is immoral too, for then it can loose
referential correctness (relatively to the most probable computational
histories) and this reduces into a sort of lie.

>QS or FIN however does not fall within the scope of objective morality
>because, in this case, the first and third person worlds are very
>significantly different. The only type of morality that applies is first
>person morality. It appears that the action of QTI or FIN actually
>creates first person information! Since I believe that measure does not
>change with QS it appears that QS or FIN is actually moral! This is a
>disturbing but IMO an inescapable conclusion!!!

Yes. And that explain why there is nothing wrong with suicide, a priori,
at least once your relative agrees and you are prudent not wounding or
killing others in the process.

Now as I said, comp is not normative and admit quite incompatible
philosophical extensions, some bearing on moral questions. 
The main difference is between those who accept teleportation with
delayed *annihilation*, and those who doesn't.
What do you think of the people of the planet Ixbul? They fear
the non success of the reconstitution so that they made themselves
annihilated only after a conversation with their own doppelganger.
Is that a form of suicide? 
Some on Ixbul accepts to do the following: to duplicate themselves
and then killing randomly, with a coin, one of them. They repeat
the trial 64 times. They do not impose the 
tribulation to any other, and that test is available for adult only.
Is that immoral? (I suppose they have found a way of killing themselves
absolutely, which does not necessarily exists with comp!).


Reply via email to