Juergen wrote:

>> BM  Let us follow Jesse Mazer
>> idea of torture. Suppose I duplicate you and reconstitute you, not
>> in Washington and Moscow but in some Paradise and some Hell.
>> Would you feel more comfortable if I tell you
>> I will reconstitute you in paradise tomorow and in hell only in
>> 3001 after C. ? Is that what you would choose?
>JS: Choose? Do I have a choice? Which is my choice?

OK I was not clear enough.
The choice is between 
1) being annihilated now and reconstitute tomorow
both in some paradise and in some hell
2) being annihilated now and and reconstitute tomorow
in some paradise and only 1000 years later in some Hell.

The "real" question I am interested in is: do you think
that for a computationalist the 1000 years delay will make
any difference with respect to the first person expectation.
Do you think, like some non-computationalist, or like
those who follows Nozick closer continuer theory of 
identity that the second choice is better for avoiding hell?


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