Saibal Mitra wrote: >Instead of the previously discussed suicide experiments to test various >versions of many-worlds theories, one might consider a different approach. > >By deleting certain sectors of one's memory one should be able to travel >to different branches of the multiverse. Suppose you are diagnosed with >a rare disease. You don't have complaints yet, but you will die >within a year. If you could delete the information that you have this >particular disease (and also the information that information has >been deleted), branches in which you don't have the disease >merge with the branches in which you do have the disease. So with >very high probability you have travelled to a different branch.
Be careful because in the process you take the risk of losing a friend. More aptly (3 1 switch) a friend risks losing you. Do you agree that at *some* level we do that all the time? Does death works as personal local and relative memory eraser ? Your suggestion is risky, if not egoist, but, is there another way when the rare disease is fatal? Thought experiment with speculative memory capture raised quickly the interesting question: how many (first) person exists, really. I don't know the answer. One ? In another post Saibal wrote: >I think the source of the problem is equation 1 of J�rgens paper. This >equation supposedly gives the probability that I am in a particular >universe, but it ignores that multiple copies of me might exist in one >universe. Let's consider a simple example. The prior probability of >universe i (i>0) is denoted as P(i), and i copies of me exist in universe >i. In this case, J�rgen computes the propability that if you pick a >universe at random, sampled with the prior P, you pick universe i. This >probability is, of course, P(i). Therefore J�rgen never has to identify >how many times I exist in a particular universe, and can ignore what >consciousness actually is. > >Surerly an open univere where an infinite number of copies of me exist is >infinitely more likely than a closed universe where I don't have any >copies, assuming that the priors are of the same order? Would you agree that a quantum multiverse could play the role of a particular "open universe where an infinite number of copies of me exists"? If you agree, would that mean we have "anthropic reasons" to believe in a quantum-like multiverse? Bruno
