> Saibal Mitra wrote:
> >Instead of the previously discussed suicide experiments to test various
> >versions of many-worlds theories, one might consider a different
> >By deleting certain sectors of one's memory one should be able to travel
> >to different branches of the multiverse. Suppose you are diagnosed with
> >a rare disease. You don't have complaints yet, but you will die
> >within a year. If you could delete the information that you have this
> >particular disease (and also the information that information has
> >been deleted), branches in which you don't have the disease
> >merge with the branches in which you do have the disease. So with
> >very high probability you have travelled to a different branch.
> Be careful because in the process you take the risk of losing a friend.
> More aptly (3 1 switch) a friend risks losing you.
> Do you agree that at *some* level we do that all the time?
> Does death works as personal local and relative memory eraser ?
> Your suggestion is risky, if not egoist, but, is there another way
> when the rare disease is fatal?
Indeed. Death will erase my memory anyway, so why not do it in a controlled
to maximize the probability of some desired outcome.
> Thought experiment with speculative memory capture raised quickly
> the interesting question: how many (first) person exists, really.
> I don't know the answer. One ?
Why not an infinite number?
> In another post Saibal wrote:
> >I think the source of the problem is equation 1 of Jürgens paper. This
> >equation supposedly gives the probability that I am in a particular
> >universe, but it ignores that multiple copies of me might exist in one
> >universe. Let's consider a simple example. The prior probability of
> >universe i (i>0) is denoted as P(i), and i copies of me exist in universe
> >i. In this case, Jürgen computes the propability that if you pick a
> >universe at random, sampled with the prior P, you pick universe i. This
> >probability is, of course, P(i). Therefore Jürgen never has to identify
> >how many times I exist in a particular universe, and can ignore what
> >consciousness actually is.
> >Surerly an open univere where an infinite number of copies of me exist is
> >infinitely more likely than a closed universe where I don't have any
> >copies, assuming that the priors are of the same order?
> Would you agree that a quantum multiverse could play the role of a
> particular "open universe where an infinite number of
> copies of me exists"?
I agree that this could be the case.
> If you agree, would that mean we have "anthropic reasons" to believe
> in a quantum-like multiverse?
That's an interesting point!