Bruno wrote: > Saibal Mitra wrote: > > >Instead of the previously discussed suicide experiments to test various > >versions of many-worlds theories, one might consider a different approach. > > > >By deleting certain sectors of one's memory one should be able to travel > >to different branches of the multiverse. Suppose you are diagnosed with > >a rare disease. You don't have complaints yet, but you will die > >within a year. If you could delete the information that you have this > >particular disease (and also the information that information has > >been deleted), branches in which you don't have the disease > >merge with the branches in which you do have the disease. So with > >very high probability you have travelled to a different branch. > > Be careful because in the process you take the risk of losing a friend. > More aptly (3 1 switch) a friend risks losing you. > > Do you agree that at *some* level we do that all the time? > Does death works as personal local and relative memory eraser ? > Your suggestion is risky, if not egoist, but, is there another way > when the rare disease is fatal?

## Advertising

Indeed. Death will erase my memory anyway, so why not do it in a controlled way to maximize the probability of some desired outcome. > > Thought experiment with speculative memory capture raised quickly > the interesting question: how many (first) person exists, really. > I don't know the answer. One ? Why not an infinite number? > > > In another post Saibal wrote: > > >I think the source of the problem is equation 1 of Jürgens paper. This > >equation supposedly gives the probability that I am in a particular > >universe, but it ignores that multiple copies of me might exist in one > >universe. Let's consider a simple example. The prior probability of > >universe i (i>0) is denoted as P(i), and i copies of me exist in universe > >i. In this case, Jürgen computes the propability that if you pick a > >universe at random, sampled with the prior P, you pick universe i. This > >probability is, of course, P(i). Therefore Jürgen never has to identify > >how many times I exist in a particular universe, and can ignore what > >consciousness actually is. > > > >Surerly an open univere where an infinite number of copies of me exist is > >infinitely more likely than a closed universe where I don't have any > >copies, assuming that the priors are of the same order? > > > Would you agree that a quantum multiverse could play the role of a > particular "open universe where an infinite number of > copies of me exists"? I agree that this could be the case. > If you agree, would that mean we have "anthropic reasons" to believe > in a quantum-like multiverse? That's an interesting point! Saibal