----- Forwarded message from Wei Dai <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> -----

Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2002 13:28:43 -0700
From: Wei Dai <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Nature Article

On Thu, Aug 15, 2002 at 12:45:17AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Dyson, L., Kleban, M. & Susskind, L. Disturbing implications of a 
> cosmological constant. Preprint <http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/hep-th/0208013>, 
> (2002). 

This is a variant on the Doomsday argument. The core argument of the paper 
is this:

If we live in a world with a true cosmological constant, then the 
observers whose observable universe is macroscopically indistinguishable 
from ours are a tiny fraction of all observers. Therefore "the only 
reasonable conclusion is that we do not live in a world with a true 
cosmological constant."

Compare this with the Doomsday argument (see 
http://www.anthropic-principle.com/primer1.html):

If we live in a world without a doomsday in the near future, then the 
observers whose birth ranks are similar to ours are a tiny fraction of all 
observers. Therefore the only reasonble conclusion is that we do not live 
in a world without a doomsday in the near future.

So you should accept the conclusion of this paper only if you think 
the Doomsday type of argument is sound.

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