----- Forwarded message from Wei Dai <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> ----- Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2002 13:28:43 -0700 From: Wei Dai <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Nature Article
On Thu, Aug 15, 2002 at 12:45:17AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Dyson, L., Kleban, M. & Susskind, L. Disturbing implications of a > cosmological constant. Preprint <http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/hep-th/0208013>, > (2002). This is a variant on the Doomsday argument. The core argument of the paper is this: If we live in a world with a true cosmological constant, then the observers whose observable universe is macroscopically indistinguishable from ours are a tiny fraction of all observers. Therefore "the only reasonable conclusion is that we do not live in a world with a true cosmological constant." Compare this with the Doomsday argument (see http://www.anthropic-principle.com/primer1.html): If we live in a world without a doomsday in the near future, then the observers whose birth ranks are similar to ours are a tiny fraction of all observers. Therefore the only reasonble conclusion is that we do not live in a world without a doomsday in the near future. So you should accept the conclusion of this paper only if you think the Doomsday type of argument is sound. ----- End forwarded message -----
