I think that the difference is that invoking the SIA does not affect the conclusion of the paper.
Saibal Wei Dai wrote: > On Thu, Aug 15, 2002 at 12:45:17AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Dyson, L., Kleban, M. & Susskind, L. Disturbing implications of a > > cosmological constant. Preprint <http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/hep-th/0208013>, > > (2002). > > This is a variant on the Doomsday argument. The core argument of the paper > is this: > > If we live in a world with a true cosmological constant, then the > observers whose observable universe is macroscopically indistinguishable > from ours are a tiny fraction of all observers. Therefore "the only > reasonable conclusion is that we do not live in a world with a true > cosmological constant." > > Compare this with the Doomsday argument (see > http://www.anthropic-principle.com/primer1.html): > > If we live in a world without a doomsday in the near future, then the > observers whose birth ranks are similar to ours are a tiny fraction of all > observers. Therefore the only reasonble conclusion is that we do not live > in a world without a doomsday in the near future. > > So you should accept the conclusion of this paper only if you think > the Doomsday type of argument is sound. > > ----- End forwarded message ----- > >