Dear Bruno,

    Interleaving. ;-)

----- Original Message -----
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2002 5:40 AM
Subject: Re: MIND and MATTER

> Dear Stephen,
> >I only have the vaguest hand waving reasoning at this time but let me
> >try to make my case as to why I asked that question. If we identify
> >with the notion of a "physical system" simulatable by Comp, following
> >the line that D. Deutsch reasons with his Church-Turing Principle, it
> >make sense that the simulations by Comp would be Boolean while Comp
> >would be Q-Logical. What I am arguing is that MATTER is a simulation by
> >MIND. I think that you are trying to argue the same. ;-)
> BM:
> OK


    So do you agree?

> >     The notion that "our thought behaves in a boolean way" only comes
> >the fact that mental behavior is modeled in terms of the manipulations of
> >symbols which is, ultimately, restricted to the possible behaviours of
> >matter ...
> BM:
> Only with some physicalist postulate. I would say it is matter which
> is ultimately restricted to possible relations between numbers.


    But I hope that you will admit that while being that is true, it is
trivial given the mathematical Platonist assumption! What ideas do you have
about a "physicalist postulate"? What can I read to learn more about this?

    Maybe my question is: how does it make sense to talk about logical
statements and relations all the while declaring that the existence of the
manipulations of physical states is just the "possible relations between
numbers"? I understand somewhat how any logical statement can be encoded as
some string of numbers, that is a "Goedelization".
    Perhaps what I need to understand how the notion of "meaning" and "time"
are recovered. ;-)

> >.... and could be considered as those aspects of MIND that can be
> >projected into MATTER.
> >     The question can be re-posed as: Is MATTER the object of MIND or is
> >the object of MATTER?
> BM:
> I would say MATTER is the object of MIND, although the reverse can be
> true. Also by MIND I would'nt mean Human Mind but the average mind
> of the universal (and immaterial) machine.


    I am trying to use MIND as an equivalence class but an still strugling
with the notion of a "universal (and immaterial) machine".
     I understand the notion of a UTM but can not understand how one can
reason consistently about computations by it or any other "Machine" without
introducing temporality and motion in some way. This is the same as asking
how can software be said to exist without some way to implement it. It is in
the implementation that time, motion, thermodynamics and other complications

> >Is "the content of observation" a simulation and not
> >"out there"?
> BM:
> They are degrees of "out there". The content of observation can be
> a simulation AND can be out there, in platonia, for example.


    Does the notion of observation itself even mean anything at the level of

> >It seems that I am asking you to question material Realism. I
> >don't think that this would be a problem for you since your COMP theory
is a
> >form, IMHO, of Idealism. ;-)
> BM:
> Sure ;-)

    What is Time in your theory? Some kind of ordering? What makes it have,
at least the appearence, of beng absolute?

Kindest regards,


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