Hi all,

On George Levy's thought experiment.
    -cf: http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3991.html

It is a pleasure of living a nice little star trek episode :) It could
perhaps, in some yet to develop approach, help to figure out where
quantum like complementarities arise. It cannot be used directly in
the uda/auda , though, because it assumes some geometry and some physics
which cannot be taken for granted at that stage. But it could be use
if and when geometry and enough part of physics are derived ...

Tim wrote:
>I also found an interesting book by Robert Goldblatt, "Mathematics 
>of Modality," 1993, which contains a paper "Diodorean Modality in 
>Minkowski Spacetime." He points out that Arthur Prior, in books from 
>the late 60s, early 70s, demonstrated that the lattice of 
>partially-ordered events in Minkowski spacetime corresponds to a 
>modal logic system called "S4.2."

Yes that's what I told you in
Actually Goldblatt's book also contains the two papers which are really
fundamental in my thesis. The modal axiomatization of Quantum Logic by
the system B, and the arithmetical embedding of intuitionist logic
through S4Grz.
- Semantic Analysis of Orthologic  (pp. 81-97)
- Arithmetical Necessity, Provability and Intuitionistic Logic (pp. 105-112).
Goldblatt's book suppose some familiarity with (modal) logic. Chellas
is a better introduction.

At 8:49 -0700 11/09/2002, Brent Meeker wrote:
>In BQM the SWE guides the particles (deterministically) and the
>particles determine the wave.  Since the whole system is
>deterministic there are no other worlds.  The particles *are*
>the world.  I don't understand your question about worlds
>without particles.

I don't think the particles determines the wave. I said (but David
Deutsch said something equivalent) that Bohm's wave option  entails the
many worlds, because the wave describe the many histories. Bohm
potential forces the particle to follows a unique branch among
those histories, but for the interference we must still take all the
parallel histories into account, even if they have no particles.
A computationalist has no means to know if he belongs to a story with
or without particles. To suppose that we belongs to the story
with particle goes against both Ockham, and comp.

Hi Wei, I got my Joyce's Book. Looks interesting. I wish I add more
time ... I will let you know if I have special comments. I see he
mentions Stalnaker's special conditional system. Those systems belong
to the same family than Scott-Montague semantics. Chellas book
on modal logic has a chapter bearing on that.


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