Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Yes. I strongly suspect that "minds" are quantum mechanical. My >arguement is at this point very hand waving, but it seems to me that if >minds are purely classical when it would not be difficult for us to imagine, >i.e. compute, what it is like to "be a bat" or any other classical mind. I >see this as implied by the ideas involved in Turing Machines and other >"Universal" classical computational systems. I'm afraid you have a pregodelian (or better a preEmilPostian) view of machine. If we are consistent machine we cannot know which machine we are. We cannot consistently identify formal and intuitive probability. Godel's and Lob's incompleteness prevent us to identify any intuitive first person knowledge with objective third person communicable statements. Gunderson has given also non-godelian argument, based on simple assymmetry considerations illustrating the point. Actually duplication experiments provide intuitive understanding of that phenomenon: if you are duplicated at the right level, none of "you" can understand what it is like to be the other. You could look at "Benacerraf" in the archive to see more. Note also the UD Argument works for quantum brain too. Although quantum states are not duplicable, it is still possible to prepare them in many instances, and that is what the UD does (quantum universal machine *are* emulable by classical machine). The no-cloning theorem is also a consequence of comp. Knowing that our experiential states supervene not on a "physical state" but on the whole set of histories going through that states, it is hard to imagine how anyone could duplicate anything below its substitution level. Bruno
