Stephen Paul King wrote: > > Dear Jamie, > > I really need to know where you acquired this idea about Goedel!!!! It > is foreign to me! Please cite me a source! I do not understand how we can go > from a proof that formal models that include arithmetic operations will > contain statements that are undecidable _within the model_ to this: "We > 'know something' that Godel would claim that we could not know and demand we > not conversantly include." > No where do I see how Goedel's theorems restrict knowledge in the way > you describe. I see quite the opposite being proven: that the undecidability > of statements (within formal models) demands that an infinite hierarchy > exists of models, meta-models, meta-meta-models, ... where the Truth values > of the model at level n are decidable in level n+1.
Stephen, In the above you have just expressed the exact difference between me and Godel, whether you appreciate it or not. I depict that information of n+1 are related to and decidable in n. This is a distinct and major difference. All relations and all potentia are present within the smallest or most limited cases of existence. An atom, if it existed as the only extant in a universe would still be denotable as 'containing' within its construct, sufficient 'information' from which to extrapolate all possible existential events and emergences of all (n+m) possibles. Even the "limitation theorems" of Godel. Which is stronger and more important a state of being than Godel's hierarchy of '(un)decidables'. Godel's paradigm -precludes- existential pragmatic holism, even if it uses deferential acknowledgement of extended infinities and meta realms. Rose's paradigm is native with existential pragmatic holism and shows the easy and normal accessibility -among- infinities and meta realms. Jamie
