Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Dear Jamie,
> I really need to know where you acquired this idea about Goedel!!!! It
> is foreign to me! Please cite me a source! I do not understand how we can go
> from a proof that formal models that include arithmetic operations will
> contain statements that are undecidable _within the model_ to this: "We
> 'know something' that Godel would claim that we could not know and demand we
> not conversantly include."
> No where do I see how Goedel's theorems restrict knowledge in the way
> you describe. I see quite the opposite being proven: that the undecidability
> of statements (within formal models) demands that an infinite hierarchy
> exists of models, meta-models, meta-meta-models, ... where the Truth values
> of the model at level n are decidable in level n+1.
In the above you have just expressed the exact difference
between me and Godel, whether you appreciate it or not.
I depict that information of n+1 are related to and
decidable in n.
This is a distinct and major difference.
All relations and all potentia are present within
the smallest or most limited cases of existence.
An atom, if it existed as the only extant in a
universe would still be denotable as 'containing'
within its construct, sufficient 'information'
from which to extrapolate all possible existential
events and emergences of all (n+m) possibles.
Even the "limitation theorems" of Godel.
Which is stronger and more important a state
of being than Godel's hierarchy of '(un)decidables'.
Godel's paradigm -precludes- existential
pragmatic holism, even if it uses deferential
acknowledgement of extended infinities and meta
Rose's paradigm is native with existential
pragmatic holism and shows the easy and
normal accessibility -among- infinities
and meta realms.