Dear Tim,
        Since you joined the list relatively more recently, you're
unlikely to have come across a couple of example in decision theory I
mentioned back in 1999
(, namely with respect
to superannuation (pension insurance) and euthanasia. This has more to
do with QTI than MWI, but since many of us think an expectation of
subjective immortality is a corollory of the MWI, this is relevant.

The argument wrt superannuation is that standard decision theory
should lead one to the same decision as the QTI case (a bit like life
insurance, except one is betting that you won't die instead that you
will) - however in such a case why would anyone choose lump sum
investment options over lifetime pension?

Noone that I could recall came up with a convincing argument against
the Euthanasia issue - it would seem that committing euthanasia on
someone is actually condemning them to an eternity of even greater
misery than if you'd just left things alone - quite the contrary to
what one expects in a single universe notion of reality.


Tim May wrote:
> Answering the last question first, "Do you find this perspective 
> useful?"...
> I'm not yet convinced of any of the utility of the MWI for any bet or 
> action, but I certainly think you are pursuing something that _might_ 
> be interesting or even useful, with a kind of "quantum decision theory" 
> view. But I've yet to see anything convincing.

A/Prof Russell Standish                  Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile)
UNSW SYDNEY 2052                         Fax   9385 6965, 0425 253119 (")
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