Dear Bruno, Interleaving many comments.
----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Saturday, January 25, 2003 10:24 AM Subject: Re: "I" the mirror > Hi Stephen, > > > > SPK: > >I have no difficulties with such notions, but would like to see a more > >general situation discussed such as how we can have a formal model of > >multiple 1-person intentionalities. I see this more general stuation as > >being the exact analogy of the "problem of time" in physics and given my > >interest in that problem I am engaging in this discussion. ;-) > > > BM: > Third person self-reference (corresponding to Kleene, Case, ...): > > p ( = Godel's beweisbar), p arithmetical proposition. > > First person "self-reference without self-name): > > p & p That gives through Kripke semantics an antisymmetrical > logic of "subjective time". > > Note G* proves p <-> (p & p), but G does not prove it!!!!!!!!!!! > > Also "p & p" is not definissable in arithmetic: the machine will hardly > confuses herself with a description, or any 3-view of herself like a > doppelganger. > > First person plural (rational plausible communicable belief) > > <>p & p p arithmetical proposition > > First person plural knowledge restricted to the DU accessible > propositions/states: > > <>p & p p \Sigma_1 arithmetical proposition. > > This gives the "quantum" modal logics Z1 and Z1*. Where the atomical > propositions (here just the leaves of DU*) are persistent in the sense that > once a lobian machine got it in her "actual world", it remains true in her > neighborhood (which is sparse in UD*). [SPK] Could you translate these symbols into words so that I could better wrap my mind around them and spin them around in my head? > Here I gave a little sketch of the translation of UDA in a "consistent > machine's language". > [SPK] I hope that you realize that there are many ideas that you are assuming tacitly that I and others are not familiar with and/or may have other definitions for. For example: exactly what do the words "consistent", "machine" and "language" mean? I take "consistent" means that given some formal model, whose exact definition must be given somehow or, at least, must be familiar to your readers, a "consistent machine's language" is one where there is no contradiction obtainable given any possible combination of the machine's language. We may note that "machines" are usually defined by some set of functions N -> N, where N are the Natural numbers. I am very skeptical that this (countable) set of numbers alone is sufficient in itself to cover the range of all possible systems in Nature (the Totality of possible existential expressions, including all mathematics). Given this caveat, is this within your notion of a definition of these words? > >SPK: > > Ok, I am not questioning whether or not there "exists" self-referential > >programs (plural???) or a "Univiversal program" (singular???), I am > >wondering about how do we go from formal existence postulation to the > >possibility of "maniferstation" itself. This is where I think that there is > >a problem if only in that the domain of explanatory power of such models > >only applies to a very narrow range. > > > BM > Not with comp by hypothesis. Manifestation are indexicals. Strictly speaking > this follows from the UDA + OCCAM RAZOR, or better UDA + MOVIE GRAPH. > (we can come back on this latter). See Maudlin 89 for something equivalent > to the movie graph. Maudlin realises the incompatibility between the > "physical supervenience thesis" (sup-phys) and comp. Because he want > sup-phys, he abandons comp. Because I postulate comp, I abandon sup-phys. > [SPK] What I am trying to argue is that we can not abondon eiter sup-phys nor comp except in the very very special case where the distinguishability between the two vanishes, e.g. a neutal monism that obtains in the infinite limit of all possible existential (or ontological) expressions and, additionally, we must not be so cavalier in our postulations. As I have tried to argue before, the notion that the mind is UTM emulable is not a proven fact and at this point should be considered to be merely a conjecture. The thought experiement using classical cloning and or teleporting of minds has several assumptions that are contrary to known physical facts, such as the imposibility of simulataneously measuring the position and momenta of all the required atoms of a brain such that a UTM could be defined that would emulate its behaviour. This, in itself, leads me to reject the entire notion of "brain cloning" and any idea that depends on it as simple idealistic. It is as fantastic as a pink unicorn. I see not way in which the classical teleportation is possible in the "real world". > SPK > >Here we find the following: > >http://www.cis.udel.edu/~case/slides/krt-consc-cs-slides.ps > > > BM: > Nice. I didn't see it! > > > SPK: > > Exactly what is the formal statement of "if she looks closely enough to > >its probable local implementation" or equivalently, "near its comp > >substitution level"? Are you assuming some kind of "delta-epsilonics" here? > > > BM: > It means that your substitution level are the neurons and you look at > the molecules which constitute the neurons. Or your substitution level > is the quarks and you look at anything apparently making up the quarks, etc. > It happens when you look at a so much fine grain that you face the 1-person > undistinguishable stories. I am not assuming "delta-epsilonics" things, but > it is an open problem if sort of "delta-epsilonics" is not dormant here. > CF: the UD dovetails on the reals, oracles, ... [SPK] Umm, this confuses me! How can we think of UD as "generating" all of physicality via computational simulations but yet seems to require the prior existence of the reals (numbers), oracles, etc. This looks like a "chicken and the egg" problem! > > >SPK: > > I still do not understand how you go from UDA to 1-uncertainty. Please > >point me to the definitions again. ;-) > > > BM: > See http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2978.html and follow up. > [SPK] This is just more on the classical teleportation idea that I am arguing is impossible in the real world! > >SPK: > > > >> BM: QM confirms that. But people have invented selecting rules, like > >> the collapse of the wave or some guiding potential, making things look > >> more Aristotelian. But Everett comes and said "why for?". > >> > > > >[SPK] > > > > Hold on! The "collapse of the wave function" is introduced to try to > >explain the disparity between the non-distributive and non-Boolean aspect of > >QM and the logic implicit within individual 1-person experiences. QM has > >been compared by David Finkelstein to a relativity of experiments, where > >there does not exist an absolute universal experiment. > > As I re-read D. Finkelstein's essay: Finite Physics, it seems that what > >you and other computationalist are proposing is identical to that Prof. > >Finkelstein is trying to generalize: > > > > "An abolute or nonrelativistic physics ... postulates > > > >1) a universal experimental language, > >2) a universal experiment, and > >3) a universal experimental subject. > > > > The universal experiment is the simultaneous determination of all the > >variables of the system. > > > BM: > Does Finkelstein interprets it in that way? I doubt that. [SPK] Finkelstein is arguing against these. But I mentioned them because it seems to me that your idea implies them! For example your "consistent machine's language" seems to be exactly the same as 1). It might help if you could show how this is not true. > > > SPK: > >The universal subject is the universe itself. > > > BM: > ? [SPK] Again, the COMP model, with its N -> N functions, seems to allow for only a single countable universe and thus matching 3). > > SPK: > >Both > >figure explicitly, fdor example, in Laplace's fantasy of the intelligence > >who knows all and does nothing." > > > > It is easy to see the analogy! > > > BM: > ? [SPK] UD seems to EXACTLY match Finkelstein's definition since it entails the the simultaneous determination of all the variables of the machine. > >SPK: > > > >> BM: And I come, if you want, and just say that if you take seriously the > >> Everett comp then you can ask "why for?" even for the Schroedinger > >Equation. > >> > > > >[SPK] > > > > I would kindly submit that neither you not I understand exactly what the > >SWE is, but to say that Everett's comp idea exists without SWE is absurd! > >It is the SWE that defines the "thereexist X" postulation of the "relative > >states" that are considered as "worlds" or "minds" or "histories", etc. , > >such that without X being assumed to exist the notion of self-aware entities > >of self-referential systems is meaningless noise, at best! > > SPK: > But that's the physicalist postulate. I show it incompatible with comp. [SPK] You wrote this! I would like to see this "show"! > SPK: > >I do not dispuse "LOGIC + ARITHMETIC". I am just wondering how it is that > >you can assume that LOGIC + ARITHMETIC can be meaningfull and persistent > >entities without having to deal with the obvious infinite regress that is > >entailed. > > > BM: > Kleene recursion theorem, or Cantor-Post-Turing Kleene sort of diagonalisation. > For the natural numbers I aknowledge that I cannot define them without > infinite regress. But then that is why I postulate them. Nobody can explain > things informally from nothing. At least arithmetical truth justifies its > own "mystery", that is that it is impossible to get them without postulating > them. > [SPK] Again, you can not do this "postulating" and make ontological claims. This is not like Euclid's postulation of points! But furthermore, why do you not postulate more than just N-> N and arithmatic operations? It seems to me that Goedel's incompleteness theorems necessitate and infinite nesting of metatheories to span the universe of mathematics such that a Totality of the "mathemacial universe" is not even enumerable! > > SPK: > > > >SPK: > >> > Your model, as I understand it, ... > >> > >> BM: > >> But I'm afraid you miss the point. It is not a "model". It is not > >> a theory. > >> It is a "theorem", a deductive argument. If you don't understand it, > >> you should tell me at which step of the reasoning you are stuck. > >> > > > >[SPK] > > > > Even so, the theorem is based on an assumption! > > BM: > Yes. Comp. > [SPK] What is COMP other than N -> N functions? COuld you explain to us how you can generate SWE using only N -> N functions, or, equivalently, how to embed complex valued functions in N? > > >SPK: > >> I am not so interested in knowing if the hypotheses are true. I am > >> enough glad for showing them refutable. > >> > >> When a computationalist practitioners accepts an artificial digital > >> brain, he does not ask for a model in its head. He asks and hope for > >> the real thing. > >> > > > >[SPK] > > > > There is no clear evidence that a digital emulation of brain activity > >will have an analogous digital 1-person associated. The strong AI hypothesis > >is merely that, a hypothesis. I am remined of the discussion that some have > >made regarding a book within which a complete description is written of > >Einstein's brain. Is it assumed that the mere enumeration, assuming > >enumerability, of the states of Einstein's brain is enough to give us a > >1-person existence of Einsten? This is silly at best! > > > BM: > Silly? But still a consequence of COMP. I guess you allude to the > "conversation with Einstein brain" by Hofstadter. It is not the simple > enumerability of Einstein's brain states which plays a role here, it is > the relative (to you) emulability of the working of its brain. > (I hope you don't give credits to Searle-like sort of "refutation of > mechanism".) > [SPK] The manual containing an enumeration of all of the brain states of Einstein is impossible by the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle. This is a "red herring"! I do give Searle some credit for trying to point out something amiss with the "Emperor's New Clothes" but not much. ;-) The key that strong AI and COMP believers in general seems to neglect the fine point that 1-person expereice is not 3-person observable. Just because for some finite testing there could be no difference between a Machine's behavior and a "human" does NOT necessitate that they have equivalent 1-person content. As a matter of fact, I have no way to prove that you are not a machine and you can not prove that this post is not just the output of a random letter generator. All we have is likelyhoods and assumptions. ;-) > >SPK: > >> In case he survives (= COMP) he can bet he is immaterial. He can choose > >> is body and travel on the nets, without any stable body. The UDA result > >> is that this imateriality is contagious, in some sense, the environment > >> cannot be more material than himself. Descartes, Hume, and Kant have > >> partially describe this. > >> > > > >[SPK] > > > > What I am pointing out is that you are assuming at least the possibility > >of an "embodiment", even if there does not exist a single stable "body". > > > BM: > I don't assume it. Only locally for some argument. See > http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m1726.html > where I make also "silly hypotheses" (like existence of embodiements) > and eliminate them eventually. You must understand that a proof is > a connected line of arguments. I don't assume anything material or > physical in the whole proof. Neither time, space, energy, equations, > etc. Just (sigma1) arithmetical truth, *in fine*. Physics appears as > an internal modality like those described above. > [SPK] This is a very good post. I will write up some comments on it seperately. Basically, I am arguing that your proof fails because classical teleportation is impossible and thus duplication is impossible. > SPK: > >We > >can extend the Einstein book to a data base that is continuously circulated > >between servers on the internet, but the question remains, unless the > >possibility of a physical server with some non-zero persistence of "being" > >is assumed, even the notion of an Einstein data base becomes impossible. > > > BM: > By the physicalist assumption, only. > > > >This exposes a problem deeper than that of the causal non-efficasy of > >"matter" within a immaterial monist theory! > > It boils down to saying that you can not postulate your cake and eat it > >too! > > BM: > ? I fail to see how notions such as "time", " casuality" and "1-person / 3-person distinctions are shown to be necessary by your model. My point is that if our 1-person experience of a world is nothing more that a string of symbols existing a priori in Platonia, why do we have enless debates about the notion of a "flow of consciousness"? It can not be "explained" away as just an illusion or "intensional stance". Immaterial strings might be capable of encoding each other as subsets but unless we have some means to explain how Nature solves mathematical problems that are both intractible by finite TMs and require that we include the means of explaining concurrent computations, e.g. we have to explain, at least, the appearence of interactions between a plurality of systems not just a single computational system. No where have I seem any COMP theorist writing or talking about the concurrensy problem exept for Pratt and his work, for the most part, is what leads me to my argument. > >> > >> SPK: > >> >would seem to make the "mirror/ sketch > >> >pad" to be a derivative or "epiphenomenona" of the UD, > >> > >> > >> BM: > >> Why epiphenomena? They are phenomenal appearances, stable patterns in > >> consistent machines memories. Dreams if you want, but stable > >> dreams in which they have partial control ... > > > >[SPK] > > > > What does the word "stable" mean in your thinking here? > > BM: > That if a Sigma_1 proposition is true then it is provable, and in > some sense, forever true. > [SPK] What is the range of Nature that is one to one and onto the class of Sigma_1 propositions? Is this class sufficient to postulate as a priori existence to obtain a quantitative explanation of our world? > > >SPK: > >> And thanks to the G/G* difference we get communicable and > >> incommunicable truth. Thanks to the Z/Z* difference we get > >> room for both physical measure and physical sensations, as > >> uncommunicable physical result of (self)measurement. > >> > >> > >> SPK: > >> >e.g. that physicality > >> >itself is merely derived from the intetionality of arithmetic statements, > >> > >> BM: > >> Yes. > >> > > > >[SPK] > > > > Ok, well how do we go from intesionality to persistence such that a > >3-person view is even possible? > > > BM: > See above. [SPK] I am sorry, Bruno. But unless you can recover your proof independent of "classical teleportation" your explanation is grossly insufficient, at least, for me. :_( > > > >> SPK: > >> >what x implies about y. My argument is that if physicality is mere > >> >epiphenomenona, is it sufficient to merely have a "belief" by S that x > >> >implies y to have a causal consequence on the possible behavior of S, > >such > >> >that if x did not imply y behavior would be 3-person distinguishable? > >> > >> BM: > >> ... would be 1-person plural distinguishable (for the technical reason > >> that the quantum, seems to appear at the star level. I am not yet sure). > > > > > >[SPK] > > > > I hope that you can explain this further soon! > > > BM: > The basic reason is that the quantum modal formula (p-> <>p) appears > only at the star level. It is a theorem of Z1* and not of Z1. This means > that the quantum like the whole George Levy sort of plenitude is more > a 1-person plural construction than a truly 3-person objective communicable > truth. It means QM belongs to "society of machines" psychology. [SPK] I would like to see an extensive elaboration of this idea! > >SPK: > >> But you are right. That is, if that is believable and consistent. > >> It is not that mind acts on matter, but it is more like the arithmetical > >> border of mind defines matter. Roughly speaking. > >> > > > >[SPK] > > > > How is this "arithmetical border of mind" any different from the > >Cartesian cut, the distiction between subject and object? > > BM > Perhaps it is not. Nice, you realize I provide a *phenomenology* of > dualism, in a purely monistic context. [SPK] Our ideas seems to be very similar but I think that you have truncated a lot of ideas into COMP that need to be more carefully examined. The possibility that we need to define a generalization for COMP that involves, at least C -> C functions (C = complex numbers) obtains in my thinking. Pratt's notion of Chu spaces with k = Complex seems to get close. I am working on a post on Pratt's ideas but have many distractions and so do not know when it will be ready to post. > >> Don't hesitate to send a readable description of Pratt's "headway" > >> for us all, anyway. Explain perhaps enough for explaining the subtle point > >> which, if I understand you, would make comp inconsistent, or perhaps > >trivial. > >> > > > >[SPK] > > > > Ok, it seems that this is inevitable, but you realize that if a person > >that is familiar with computer science, such as yourself, is having > >difficulties understanding Pratt's paper, imagine the mere amateur such as > >myself! I find this incredible! Is there nothing in his paper that gives you > >a "toehold" on what he is talking about? BTW, you are not the first to not > >understand his idea! I have tried to engage Pratt directly in a discussion > >of his paper and so has Peter Wegner, but he seems to not be willing to do > >so for some reason. > > Since so much of my own idea depends on Pratt's notions, I will try to > >produce a "readable description", but it will take some time and effort. > > > BM: > Both Wegner and Pratt's paper are interesting for their own sake but, imo, > lack philosophical rigor. Wegner's idea to use SIM, ... for getting the > quantum is refuted by the kochen-Specker theorem, for example. > But thank you for the effort in writing a post on Pratt and your > views. My current feeling is that you are physicalist, but you want > keep comp. But that's just impossible. (Unless there is a flaw in my > reasoning, of course). [SPK] Let us continue our explorations of ideas and I hope to explain to you how I am neither a PHYSICAList nor a COMPutationalist. I have a thought that might show how there might be a flaw in your reasoning and it is that just because UTMs are independent of any particular physical implementation does not obtain that UTMs do not require, at least, some approximate implementation in physicality. Numbers are meaningless if there does not exist some 1-person notion of "numberness". Like the number three is a meaningless symbol, at best, if there is not some set of objects that is associable with "threeness". More on this in the next post. ;-) Kindest regards, Stephen