Saibal Mitra writes: > This sounds very strange to me. Arguably one could say that my brain is > simulating me (where I associate myself with a particular algorithm). I > would say that any physical process computing me has to have my > consciousness. So, if someone starts to simulate me, there is a 50% > probability that I will find myself in that situation. This, i.m.o. > reasonable assumption, solves the causality paradox in Newcomb's problem.
I had made a similar argument last year on the Everything list, at http://www.mail-archive.com/[EMAIL PROTECTED]/msg03775.html (towards the end of the post). An important point is that for Newcomb's problem to be a paradox, you have to assume there is no causality from your choice to the box contents. Resolutions like this one find ways to re-introduce causality. Given causality, there is no longer any argument against choosing both boxes and no paradox. You might still imagine a Newcomb problem where the omniscient being makes his prediction without simulating you, at least not enough to make you conscious. Perhaps he just does a crude simulation. Or maybe he has done the experiment many times with other people and has discovered a correlation between the decisions people make in this situation and other psychological traits. It's certainly conceivable that such techniques would allow the predictor to be very accurate even without running a conscious simulation. And in that case the paradox still holds. Hal