I just have one question to clarify your position.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Eric Cavalcanti" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, November 05, 2003 6:06 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum accident survivor
> But suppose you just stepped outside the Paris duplicator. Unaware of the
> experiment that is being made, your last memory is sitting in front of
> computer, reading this email. Suddenly, you see the Eiffel Tower. That
> would surely be a psychological experience that we don't have too often.
> And since there are infinite copies of yourself at any given moment, if
> should expect to be any of them at the next moment, you shouldn't expect
> to ever feel the continuous experience you do.
> Therefore, since I do actually have a continuous experience of myself,
> then 'I am not my copies'.
Are you arguing that not experiencing these abrupt experiences is a proof
that there is a difference between you and your copies? This would be the
case only if you made the rather controversial assumption that there
couldn't be a (extremely large) difference in probability between ending up
among the infinities of normal continuations and ending up among the
infinities of abrupt experiences. Right?