Hi, I just have one question to clarify your position.
----- Original Message ----- From: "Eric Cavalcanti" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Wednesday, November 05, 2003 6:06 AM Subject: Re: Quantum accident survivor > But suppose you just stepped outside the Paris duplicator. Unaware of the > experiment that is being made, your last memory is sitting in front of your > computer, reading this email. Suddenly, you see the Eiffel Tower. That > would surely be a psychological experience that we don't have too often. > And since there are infinite copies of yourself at any given moment, if you > should expect to be any of them at the next moment, you shouldn't expect > to ever feel the continuous experience you do. > > Therefore, since I do actually have a continuous experience of myself, > then 'I am not my copies'. Are you arguing that not experiencing these abrupt experiences is a proof that there is a difference between you and your copies? This would be the case only if you made the rather controversial assumption that there couldn't be a (extremely large) difference in probability between ending up among the infinities of normal continuations and ending up among the infinities of abrupt experiences. Right? > > -Eric. > > Dag-Ove Reistad
