snip
Well, I do believe in continuity of consciousness, modulo the issues of measure. That is, I think some continuations would be more likely to be experienced than others. For example, if you started up 9 computers each running one copy of me (all running the same program so they stay in sync), and one computer running a different copy of me, my current theory is that I would expect to experience the first version with 90% probability.
Almost OK, but perhaps false if you put *the measure* on the (infinite)
computations going through those states. I mean, if the 9 computers
running one copy of you just stop (in some absolute way I ask you to conceive for
the benefit of the argument), and if the one computer running the
different copy, instead of stopping, is multiplied eventually into many
self-distinguishable copies of you, then putting the measure on the histories should
make you expect to experience (and memorized) the second version more probably.
It is the idea I like to summarize in the following diagram:
\ / | |
\ / | |
\/ = | |
| | |
| | |That is, it is like a "future" bifurcation enhances your present measure. It is why I think comp confirms Deutsch idea that QM branching is really QM differentiation. What do you think? I mean, do you conceive that the measure could be put only on the "maximal" possible computations?
Bruno
Bruno
