At 14:36 07/11/03 -0800, Hal Finney wrote:

snip


Well, I do believe in continuity of consciousness, modulo the issues
of measure.  That is, I think some continuations would be more likely to
be experienced than others.  For example, if you started up 9 computers
each running one copy of me (all running the same program so they stay
in sync), and one computer running a different copy of me, my current
theory is that I would expect to experience the first version with 90%
probability.


Almost OK, but perhaps false if you put *the measure* on the (infinite)
computations going through those states. I mean, if the 9 computers
running one copy of you just stop (in some absolute way I ask you to conceive for
the benefit of the argument), and if the one computer running the
different copy, instead of stopping, is multiplied eventually into many
self-distinguishable copies of you, then putting the measure on the histories should
make you expect to experience (and memorized) the second version more probably.


It is the idea I like to summarize in the following diagram:

\        /                     |      |
  \    /                       |      |
    \/               =        |      |
     |                         |      |
     |                         |      |

That is, it is like a "future" bifurcation enhances your present measure.
It is why I think comp confirms Deutsch idea that QM branching is really
QM differentiation. What do you think? I mean, do you conceive that the
measure could be put only on the "maximal" possible computations?

Bruno


Bruno






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