This is the ''white rabbit'' problem which was discussed on this list a few years ago. This can be solved by assuming that there exists a measure over the set of al universes, favoring simpler ones.
Also, note that there is no such thing as ''next possible'' states. Once you consider the whole of Platonia all you have is a probability distribution over the set of all possible states you can be in (because you can't define time in a normal way anymore). There is no conditional probability for your next experience given what you have experienced now. A valid question is: What is the probability that you will be in a state P that contains the memory that you have been in a state P'. Quoting Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > On 25 April 2004 Kory Heath wrote: > > QUOTE- > Not yet. We know that the bizarre, inconsistent worlds must exist if the > Platonia idea is correct, but we (or at least I) don't currently know how > likely they are. In Platonia, there are X number of possible-next-states > from my current state. (For simplicity's sake, lets even say that X is a > very very large finite number.) If a vast majority of these states show me > > sitting in my chair typing, with my computer not turning into a kangaroo, > etc., then no, the fact that my world so far has not been bizarre and > inconsistent does *not* cast doubt on the validity of the Platonia theory. > > In fact, if we can show logically, mathematically, or computationally (for > > me these are all ultimately the same thing) that a vast majority of my > next-possible-states do in fact show me sitting in my chair typing, with > very few computers turning into kangaroos, this would be an extremely > strong > reason to believe that the Platonia theory is correct, because it's > survived > a rather stringent falsification test. > -ENDQUOTE > > This analysis is sound only in the common sense single world situation. You > > get into trouble if you try to use conventional probabilities if multiple > histories/worlds/copies are allowed, as I tried to show with the > teleportation example. > > Suppose that the overwhelming majority of your next- possible-states are > totally bizarre, according to the theory we are testing. If only one copy > of > you can exist at any one time, then the theory predicts that there is a > billion to one probability that in the next second you will find yourself > in > a bizarre universe. As a matter of fact, as you read these words, you do > not > find that the world around you suddenly becomes bizarre. Therefore, the > theory is most likely wrong. > > Consider now a similar theory, but multiple copies of you are allowed. The > > theory predicts that there will be one billion branchings of the world in > the next second, with each branch containing a person who shares all your > memories up to that point. The theory also predicts, as above, that all but > > one of these worlds will be obviously bizarre. As a matter of fact, as you > > read these words, you do not experience the world around you suddenly > becoming bizarre. But unlike the previous example, this is entirely > consistent with the theory, which predicted that one version of you would > continue in the world as per usual. > > --Stathis Papaioannou > > ____________________________________________________________ _____ > Get Extra Storage in 10MB, 25MB, 50MB and 100MB options now! Go to > http://join.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-au&page=hotmail/es2 > -- _____________________________________________________________________ Zon Gratis ADSL. De voordelen van gratis internet met de snelheid van ADSL. Zonder abonnementskosten en zonder vast contract. Je betaalt alleen voor de tijd online. Nu zonder aansluitkosten en met gratis modem. Bestel snel op zonnet.nl.