Bruno Marchal wrote:
when you say that the first person is all there is I am not sure it fits nicely with
the methodology I am following. I am not sure I understand why you don't need the UD,
given that the UD is just a nice third person description of the comp plenitude.
[That such a thing could exist is a highly non trivial consequence of the closure of
the set of programmable functions for the diagonalization: the existence of a universal
machine. (The Post Turing discovery)]. Cf the diagonalization posts.
These are difficult issues... First it seems that the UD does not have to be a basic assumption from which the plenitude can be derived. I think you agree with that.
Another issue is that if we begin with the basic assumption of first person perspective (from which the third person can be derived when first persons share the same frame of reference) then the plenitude should necessarily be regarded from the first person perspective.
Is it correct to say that the plenitude is invariant when seen from the first person? In other words, are all the future potentialities present in the same amount as seen by any observer (no matter how little or how much his life is compromised by his circumstances)? This may be a basic invariance law in the MWI similar to the invariance of c in relativity.
If this invariance is true, then your statement that the UD is a nice third person description for the plenitude is OK however it would only be a derivation from the plenitude invariance principle The UD would also be invariant to describe or generate the plenitude, for any observer.
Please recall me your feelings about the comp hyp in the cognitive science/philosophy
of mind, if you mind.
This is a hard question to answer, but I'll give it a try. I am very committed to the first person "relativistic" or "relative" perspective. I believe that science has been gradually moving toward it from the days of Galileo and Copernicus. Einstein made the "I" relative in space and time. Everett made it relative in the quantum realm. I want to push that to its ultimate conclusion: that the "I" should be the basic axiom from which everything else derives. In "I", I include consciousness and its logical process.
I reviewed your Universal Dovetailer Argument. at your internet site and I agree very much with it. However, I have some questions. Step 1-11 forces the reader to consider the first person perspective. Step 12 may have been taken too hastily. It presumes that the observer in steps 1-11 exists in a plenitude (for example a closed set of the set of programmable functions). This is not clear. In fact step 1-11 could have been taken in a reduced universe.