Daer Bruno and George,
At the risk of being massively naive, does this idea seem to be related
to the infamous problem of Boltzmann's Stosszahlansatz?
My reasoning is that in order to figure out how do define a universal
prior (or probability measure for the initiona conditions that led
inevitably to our common world of experience) we need to understand how to
define a ration of worlds like ours to all possible worlds, or the
computational equivalent: algorithms that generate worlds like ours as a
subset of the collection of all possible algorithms.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Thursday, May 06, 2004 6:14 AM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
> I agree with George, but note that I arrive at an equivalent
> assertion without using that "lower levels have lower complexity
> and therefore higher measure". That is possible, but
> the problem is that it is a priori hard to estimate the "dumbness"
> of the universal dovetailer which is quite capable to entangle high
> complexity programs with low complexity programs, so that
> the "multiplication" related to low-complexity can be inherited to
> high-complexity (due to dovetailing). But you may be right, I have not
> proved that "a" UD could be that dumb! From a suggestion of Jacques
> Bailhache (an old everythinger) I have try to build an explicit
> UD which makes the measure on computations arbitrary, but I have
> not succeed, in the limit (on which bears the first points of view),
> the "right measure" seems to self-correct by itself. It is that
> self-measure I study with provability logic.
> Another problem with the idea of "low" level, or of "simple program"
> is that even a program with 2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^64
> as minimal bit-length is quite little in comparison of almost all number
> in Plato Heaven.
> At 15:56 05/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
> >This has been an interesting thread. Unfortunately I was too busy to
> >contribute much. However, here is a thought regarding simulation versus
> >first and third person points of view.
> >It does make sense to talk about a 3rd person point of view about
> >simulation of a conscious entity on a computer. However, I don't think it
> >applies to a first person point of view.
> >In the plenitude we'll have an infinite number of levels of simulation as
> >well as an infinite number of simulations per level (2^aleph_0 as
> >suggested by Bruno in a previous post, or higher)
> > From a first person point of view any observer moment in any simulation
> > and at any level can transit to another observer moment in a different
> > simulation at a different level provided the transition is consistent
> > with the observer. Therefore from the first person point of view there
> > no such a thing as living in a simulator. As first persons we live in
> > simulators and at all levels.
> >In addition, since lower levels have lower complexity and therefore
> >measure, the number of simulations is higher at lower levels.
> >Therefore we are more likely to occupy ensembles of simulations located
> >the lower levels. Is there a lowest level in the level hierarchy, that is
> >a level below which there is no simulation, just the plenitude? Possibly.
> >If so, we are most likely to exist "most of the time" at that base level,
> >but we cannot exclude that "some of the time" we may be in a higher
> >hmmmm. This argument points to the fact that "most of the time" we do not
> >live in a simulator!