Daer Bruno and George, At the risk of being massively naive, does this idea seem to be related to the infamous problem of Boltzmann's Stosszahlansatz?
http://www.lns.cornell.edu/spr/1999-02/msg0014388.html http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001244/01/Winsberg_laws_and__statmech.doc My reasoning is that in order to figure out how do define a universal prior (or probability measure for the initiona conditions that led inevitably to our common world of experience) we need to understand how to define a ration of worlds like ours to all possible worlds, or the computational equivalent: algorithms that generate worlds like ours as a subset of the collection of all possible algorithms. Kindest regards, Stephen ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Thursday, May 06, 2004 6:14 AM Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer? > I agree with George, but note that I arrive at an equivalent > assertion without using that "lower levels have lower complexity > and therefore higher measure". That is possible, but > the problem is that it is a priori hard to estimate the "dumbness" > of the universal dovetailer which is quite capable to entangle high > complexity programs with low complexity programs, so that > the "multiplication" related to low-complexity can be inherited to > high-complexity (due to dovetailing). But you may be right, I have not > proved that "a" UD could be that dumb! From a suggestion of Jacques > Bailhache (an old everythinger) I have try to build an explicit > UD which makes the measure on computations arbitrary, but I have > not succeed, in the limit (on which bears the first points of view), > the "right measure" seems to self-correct by itself. It is that > self-measure I study with provability logic. > Another problem with the idea of "low" level, or of "simple program" > is that even a program with 2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^64 > as minimal bit-length is quite little in comparison of almost all number > in Plato Heaven. > > Bruno > > At 15:56 05/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote: > >This has been an interesting thread. Unfortunately I was too busy to > >contribute much. However, here is a thought regarding simulation versus > >first and third person points of view. > > > >It does make sense to talk about a 3rd person point of view about > >simulation of a conscious entity on a computer. However, I don't think it > >applies to a first person point of view. > > > >In the plenitude we'll have an infinite number of levels of simulation as > >well as an infinite number of simulations per level (2^aleph_0 as > >suggested by Bruno in a previous post, or higher) > > > > From a first person point of view any observer moment in any simulation > > and at any level can transit to another observer moment in a different > > simulation at a different level provided the transition is consistent > > with the observer. Therefore from the first person point of view there is > > no such a thing as living in a simulator. As first persons we live in all > > simulators and at all levels. > > > >In addition, since lower levels have lower complexity and therefore higher > >measure, the number of simulations is higher at lower levels. > > > >Therefore we are more likely to occupy ensembles of simulations located at > >the lower levels. Is there a lowest level in the level hierarchy, that is > >a level below which there is no simulation, just the plenitude? Possibly. > >If so, we are most likely to exist "most of the time" at that base level, > >but we cannot exclude that "some of the time" we may be in a higher level. > > > >hmmmm. This argument points to the fact that "most of the time" we do not > >live in a simulator! > > > >George > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > >